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McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n 
 
12-536 
 
Ruling Below: McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 893 F.Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012), cert. 
granted, 133 S.Ct. 1242. 
 
Prospective campaign contributor, political party's national committee, and nonparty political 
committee brought action challenging constitutionality of Federal Elections Campaign Act's 
(FECA) aggregate limit on candidate contributions and other contributions to party committees. 
Federal Election Commission filed motion to dismiss.  A three-judge panel of the District Court 
held that FECA's aggregate limit on candidate contributions and other contributions to party 
committees were a permissible means under First Amendment of preventing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption, and were not unconstitutionally overbroad. 
 
Question Presented: (1) Whether the biennial limit on contributions to non-candidate 
committees is unconstitutional for lacking a constitutionally cognizable interest as applied to 
contributions to national party committees; (2) whether the biennial limits on contributions to 
non-candidate committees are unconstitutional facially for lacking a constitutionally cognizable 
interest; (3) whether the biennial limits on contributions to non-candidate committees are 
unconstitutionally too low, as applied and facially; and (4) whether the biennial limit on 
contributions to candidate committees is unconstitutional for lacking a constitutionally 
cognizable interest. 
 
 
 
Shaun MCCUTCHEON, et al., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Defendant. 
United States District Court, District of Columbia 
Decided on September 28, 2012 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
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BROWN, Circuit Judge 
Congress enacted the Federal Elections 
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) to “promote 
fair practices in the conduct of election 
campaigns for Federal political offices.” 
Since 1972, the law has changed 
significantly. The current iteration of FECA 
imposes contribution limits stratified to 
track both the identity of the contributor and 
the identity of the receiver. Individuals, 
however, cannot necessarily contribute as 
much as they might wish within these limits; 
they, and only they, must comply with a 
second regulatory tier: a set of aggregate 
contribution limits.  Plaintiffs Shaun 
McCutcheon and the Republican National 
Committee (“RNC”) now challenge these 
aggregate limits as unconstitutional. We 
reject their challenge. 
I. Background 
A. Legal Background 
In 1974, Congress amended FECA to 
prohibit persons from contributing more 
than $1,000 to any political candidate, 
individuals from contributing more than an 
aggregate of $25,000 in any calendar year, 
and political committees from contributing 
more than $5,000 to any political candidate.  
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld these 
contribution limits in the face of a First 
Amendment challenge, though it struck 
down FECA’s expenditure limits [in 
Buckley v. Valeo].  A few months after the 
Buckley Court handed down its decision, 
Congress amended FECA to distinguish (1) 
between contributions by persons and 
contributions by multicandidate political 
committees, and (2) among contributions to 
candidates and their authorized committees, 
contributions to national political party 
committees, and contributions to all other 
political committees. Congress left the 
$25,000 aggregate limit on individuals’ 
contributions untouched, however, until the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA), which replaced the $25,000 
aggregate limit with the bifurcated limiting 
scheme that Plaintiffs now challenge.  There 
are thus two sets of contribution limits: base 
limits calibrated to the identity of the 
contributor regulating how much the 
contributor may give to specified categories 
of recipients, and a set of aggregate limits 
regulating the total amount an individual 
may contribute in any two-year election 
cycle. Some (but not all) of these limits are 
periodically indexed for inflation. 
  
The default base limits apply to 
contributions by “persons,” that is, 
individuals, partnerships, committees, 
associations, corporations, unions, and other 
organizations. FECA currently prohibits 
persons from contributing more than $2,500 
per election to any given candidate or that 
candidate’s agent or authorized committee; 
more than $30,800 in any calendar year to 
each of a national political party’s national 
committee, House campaign committee, and 
Senate campaign committee; more than 
$10,000 in any calendar year to a state party 
political committee; and more than $5,000 
in any calendar year to any other political 
committee.  
  
These base contribution limits do not limit 
how much a contributor can contribute as 
long as the contributions remain within the 
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limits for each recipient. Under the base 
contribution limits, for example, an 
individual might contribute $3.5 million to 
one party and its affiliated committees in a 
single election cycle. The aggregate limits 
prevent this. During each two-year period 
starting in an odd-numbered year, no 
individual may contribute more than an 
aggregate of $46,200 to candidates and their 
authorized committees or more than $70,800 
to anyone else. Of that $70,800, no more 
than $46,200 may be contributions to 
political committees that are not national 
political party committees. These aggregate 
limits, which amount to a total biennial limit 
of $117,000 thus prevent individuals from 
contributing the statutory maximum to more 
than eighteen candidates. 
  
FECA includes a number of provisions 
designed to prevent evasion of the various 
limits. First, anyone who contributes more 
than permitted may be subject to civil or 
criminal penalties. Second, indirect 
contributions, such as earmarked 
contributions to an intermediary, are deemed 
contributions to that candidate.  Third, 
FECA prohibits contributions made in the 
name of someone else. Finally, contributions 
made or received by more than one 
“affiliated” committee are deemed to have 
been made or received by the same 
committee.  
B. Factual and Procedural Background 
McCutcheon is an Alabama resident eligible 
to vote in a U.S. presidential election. Thus 
far, during the 2011–2012 election cycle, he 
has contributed a total of $33,088 to sixteen 
different candidates in amounts ranging 
from $1,776 to $2,500 per election; $1,776 
to each of the RNC, the National Republican 
Senatorial Committee (“NRSC”), and the 
National Republican Congressional 
Committee (“NRCC”); $2,000 to a nonparty 
political committee (the Senate 
Conservatives Fund); and $20,000 to the 
federal account of a state party committee 
(the Alabama Republican Party), 
McCutcheon, however, wants to contribute 
more. He wants to contribute $1,776 to 
twelve other candidates and enough money 
to the RNC, NRSC, and NRCC to bring his 
total contributions up to $25,000 each. 
Doing either of these, however, would 
violate the aggregate limits: the additional 
candidate contributions would amount to 
aggregate candidate contributions of 
$54,400, and the additional party committee 
contributions would amount to aggregate 
contributions of $75,000 to national party 
committees. McCutcheon assures us he 
intends to repeat these donation patterns 
during future election cycles. 
  
The RNC, meanwhile, wishes to receive 
contributions from individuals like 
McCutcheon that would be permissible 
under the base limits but violate the 
aggregate limit on contributions to party 
committees. Because of the aggregate limit, 
the RNC has both refused and returned 
contributions. The RNC believes that others 
would contribute to the RNC but for the 
limit. According to the verified complaint, 
the RNC does not control either the NRSC 
or the NRCC. 
  
Plaintiffs challenge both the $46,200 
aggregate limit on candidate contributions 
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and the $70,800 aggregate limit on other 
contributions under the First Amendment. 
They challenge the $46,200 aggregate limit 
for being “unsupported by any cognizable 
government interest ... at any level of 
review” and for being unconstitutionally 
low. They challenge the $70,800 aggregate 
limit facially, as applied to contributions up 
to $30,800 per calendar year to national 
party committees, and for being too low, 
both facially and as applied to contributions 
to national party committees. Plaintiffs also 
ask this Court for a preliminary injunction to 
enjoin Federal Election Commission 
(“FEC”) enforcement of the aggregate 
limits. We consolidated the preliminary 
injunction hearing with the hearing on the 
merits and now resolve both issues. 
II. Discussion 
A. Level of Scrutiny 
Both contribution limits and expenditure 
limits implicate “the most fundamental” 
First Amendment interests, but each does so 
in a different way. The Supreme Court has 
accordingly applied different levels of 
scrutiny to each: expenditure limits are 
subject to strict scrutiny, while contribution 
limits will be valid as long as they satisfy 
“the lesser demand of being closely drawn 
to match a sufficiently important interest.” 
The Court has never repudiated this 
distinction. 
  
Plaintiffs argue that the aggregate limits 
must be subject to strict scrutiny because 
laws burdening political speech are subject 
to strict scrutiny and the aggregate limits 
“similarly ‘burden’ First Amendment 
rights.” This syllogism is rooted in Buckley 
itself. The Buckley Court did not 
unequivocally hold that political 
expenditures are speech. Rather, it drew on 
the fact that “virtually every means of 
communicating ideas in today’s mass 
society requires the expenditure of money” 
to hold that “[a] restriction on the amount of 
money a person or group can spend on 
political communication during a campaign 
necessarily reduces the quantity of 
expression by restricting the number of 
issues discussed, the depth of their 
exploration, and the size of the audience 
reached.” Thus, the Court suggested, 
contribution limits might sometimes 
implicate rights of expression in more than a 
“marginal” way, like a spiking seismograph 
at the onset of an earthquake. More recently, 
Citizens United proclaimed that “[l]aws that 
burden political speech are ‘subject to strict 
scrutiny,’ ” and this Court relied on that 
principle to preliminarily enjoin the FEC 
from enforcing limits on contributions to a 
political committee interested in making 
independent expenditures. Although we 
acknowledge  the constitutional line 
between political speech and political 
contributions grows increasingly difficult to 
discern, we decline Plaintiffs’ invitation to 
anticipate the Supreme Court’s agenda. 
Every contribution limit may “logically 
reduce[ ] the total amount that the recipient 
of the contributions otherwise could spend,” 
but for now, “this truism does not mean 
limits on contributions are simultaneously 
considered limits on expenditures that 
therefore receive strict scrutiny.”  
Plaintiffs try to escape the consequences of 
lesser scrutiny by arguing that the aggregate 
limits are actually expenditure limits, not 
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contribution limits. Because § 441a(a)(1) 
already establishes base contribution limits, 
they say, “added biennial contribution limits 
are more appropriately deemed expenditure 
limits, subject to strict scrutiny.” They are 
wrong. The difference between 
contributions and expenditures is the 
difference between giving money to an 
entity and spending that money directly on 
advocacy. Contribution limits are subject to 
lower scrutiny because they primarily 
implicate the First Amendment rights of 
association, not expression, and contributors 
remain able to vindicate their associational 
interests in other ways; the limits primarily 
implicate associational rights rather than 
rights of expression because they impose 
only a “marginal” restriction on the 
contributor’s “ability to engage in free 
communication,” they impose only a 
marginal restriction on a contributor’s 
expressive ability because the expressive 
value of a contribution derives from the 
“undifferentiated, symbolic act of 
communicating,” and the expressive value 
of contributions is limited because “the 
transformation of contributions into political 
debate involves speech by someone other 
than the contributor.” The aggregate limits 
do not regulate money injected directly into 
the nation’s political discourse; the regulated 
money goes into a pool from which another 
entity draws to fund its advocacy. To break 
the chain of legal consequences tied to that 
fact would require a judicial act we are not 
empowered to perform. 
B. The Merits 
The government may justify the aggregate 
limits as a means of preventing corruption or 
the appearance of corruption, or as a means 
of preventing circumvention of contribution 
limits imposed to further its anticorruption 
interest. The Supreme Court has recognized 
no other governmental interest “sufficiently 
important to outweigh the First Amendment 
interests implicated by contributions for 
political speech.” “Corruption,” though, is a 
narrow term of art: “Elected officials are 
influenced to act contrary to their 
obligations of office by the prospect of 
financial gain to themselves or infusions of 
money into their campaigns. The hallmark 
of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: 
dollars for political favors.” Influence over 
or access to elected officials does not 
amount to corruption.  
  
Citizens United left unclear the 
constitutionally permissible scope of the 
government’s anticorruption interest. It both 
restricted the concept of quid-pro-quo 
corruption to bribery, and suggested that 
there is a wheeling-and-dealing space 
between pure bribery and mere influence 
and access where elected officials are 
“corrupt” for acting contrary to their 
representative obligations. Yet if anything is 
clear, it is that contributing a large amount 
of money does not ipso facto implicate the 
government’s anticorruption interest. The 
government’s assertion that large 
contributions “could easily exert a 
corrupting influence on the democratic 
system” and would present “the appearance 
of corruption that is ‘inherent in a regime of 
large individual financial contributions’ ” 
simply sweeps too broadly. McCutcheon 
alleges that he has “deeply held principles 
regarding government and public policy,” 
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believing that “the United States is slowly 
but surely losing its character as an 
exceptional nation that stands for liberty and 
limited government under the Constitution.” 
He wants to contribute to a number of 
candidates “who are interested in advancing 
the cause of liberty.” Supporting general 
principles of governance does not bespeak 
corruption; such is democracy. “It is in the 
nature of an elected representative to favor 
certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, 
to favor the voters and contributors who 
support those policies.”  
  
Plaintiffs do not, however, challenge the 
base contribution limits, so we may assume 
they are valid expressions of the 
government’s anticorruption interest. And 
that being so, we cannot ignore the ability of 
aggregate limits to prevent evasion of the 
base limits. Circumvention, after all, can be 
“very hard to trace.” Eliminating the 
aggregate limits means an individual might, 
for example, give half-a-million dollars in a 
single check to a joint fundraising 
committee comprising a party’s presidential 
candidate, the party’s national party 
committee, and most of the party’s state 
party committees. After the fundraiser, the 
committees are required to divvy the 
contributions to ensure that no committee 
receives more than its permitted share, but 
because party committees may transfer 
unlimited amounts of money to other party 
committees of the same party, the half-a-
million-dollar contribution might 
nevertheless find its way to a single 
committee’s coffers. That committee, in 
turn, might use the money for coordinated 
expenditures, which have no “significant 
functional difference” from the party’s 
direct candidate contributions.  The 
candidate who knows the coordinated 
expenditure funding derives from that single 
large check at the joint fundraising event 
will know precisely where to lay the wreath 
of gratitude. 
  
Gratitude, of course, is not itself a 
constitutionally-cognizable form of 
corruption, and it may seem unlikely that so 
many separate entities would willingly serve 
as conduits for a single contributor’s 
interests. But it is not hard to imagine a 
situation where the parties implicitly agree 
to such a system, and there is no reason to 
think the quid pro quo of an exchange 
depends on the number of steps in the 
transaction. The Supreme Court has rejected 
the argument that Congress cannot restrict 
coordinated spending as an 
anticircumvention measure because there are 
“better crafted safeguards” in place like the 
earmarking rules. We follow the Court’s 
lead and conceive of the contribution limits 
as a coherent system rather than merely a 
collection of individual limits stacking 
prophylaxis upon prophylaxis. 
  
Given our conclusion that the aggregate 
limits are justified, we reject Plaintiffs’ 
arguments that the limits are 
unconstitutionally low and 
unconstitutionally overbroad. It is not the 
judicial role to parse legislative judgment 
about what limits to impose. Only if there 
are “danger signs” that the limits are not 
closely drawn will we examine the record to 
review the statute’s tailoring. We see no 
danger signs here. Plaintiffs’ argument 
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depends on using “simple arithmetic” to 
translate the Vermont contribution limits 
invalidated in Randall to imaginary biennial 
limits on contributions to party committees 
and candidates. They argue that the limit on 
contributions to state party committees 
invalidated by Randall is equivalent to a 
biennial contribution limit of $198,389 to 
national party committees, which they 
explain is about $14,000 more than the total 
amount an individual could biennially 
contribute to the three committees—an 
amount an individual still cannot contribute 
because of the aggregate limits. They 
likewise argue that if an individual wanted 
to contribute equally to “one candidate of 
his choice in all 468 federal races” in 2006, 
he would be limited to contributing $85.29 
per candidate for the entire election cycle, an 
amount “far below the $200 limit held too 
low in Randall.” Even granting that 
Plaintiffs’ methodology and results are 
correct, “the dictates of the First 
Amendment are not mere functions of the 
Consumer Price Index.” The effect of the 
aggregate limits on a challenger’s ability to 
wage an effective campaign is limited 
because the aggregate limits do not apply to 
nonindividuals. And in any event, 
individuals remain able to volunteer, join 
political associations, and engage in 
independent expenditures.  
  
Plaintiffs’ overbreadth challenge consists of 
the conclusory assertions that the aggregate 
limits substantially inhibit protected speech 
and association “not only in an absolute 
sense, but also relative to the scope of the 
law’s plainly legitimate applications,” and 
that “there is no ‘scope of ... plainly 
legitimate applications’ ” since neither 
political party proliferation nor movement of 
“massive” amounts of money through party 
committees or PACs to candidates is now 
possible. The Buckley Court rejected 
challenges that the contribution limits are 
overbroad because most contributors are not 
seeking a quo for their quid and the base 
contribution limit is “unrealistically low.” 
Aside from these two claims, which we join 
the Buckley Court in rejecting, Plaintiffs do 
not explain how the aggregate limits 
potentially regulate both protected and 
unprotected conduct. Plaintiffs’ overbreadth 
argument is essentially a severability claim, 
but because we conclude that nothing needs 
to be severed, this argument fails. 
  
Plaintiffs raise the troubling possibility that 
Citizens United undermined the entire 
contribution limits scheme, but whether that 
case will ultimately spur a new evaluation of 
Buckley is a question for the Supreme Court, 
not us. 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will 
issue a contemporaneous Order denying 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction and granting the FEC’s motion to 
dismiss. 
ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
For the reasons set forth in the 
Memorandum Opinion, it is this 28th day of 
September, 2012, hereby ordered that the 
Defendant Federal Election Commission’s 
motion to dismiss is granted; it is further 
ordered that the Plaintiff’s motion for a 
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preliminary injunction is dismissed as moot; 
and it is further ordered that final judgment 
be entered for the defendant. 
  
SO ORDERED 
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“Justices Take Case on Overall Limit to Political Donations” 
 
New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
February 19, 2013 
 
The Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed to 
hear a challenge to federal campaign 
contribution limits, setting the stage for what 
may turn out to be the most important 
federal campaign finance case since the 
court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United, 
which struck down limits on independent 
campaign spending by corporations and 
unions. 
The latest case is an attack on the other main 
pillar of federal campaign finance 
regulation: limits on contributions made 
directly to political candidates and some 
political committees. 
“In Citizens United, the court resisted 
tinkering with the rules for contribution 
limits,” said Richard L. Hasen, an expert on 
election law at the University of California, 
Irvine. “This could be the start of chipping 
away at contribution limits.” 
The central question is in one way modest 
and in another ambitious. It challenges only 
aggregate limits — overall caps on 
contributions to several candidates or 
committees — and does not directly attack 
the more familiar basic limits on 
contributions to individual candidates or 
committees. Should the court agree that 
those overall limits are unconstitutional, 
however, its decision could represent a 
fundamental reassessment of a basic 
distinction established in Buckley v. Valeo in 
1976, which said contributions may be 
regulated more strictly than expenditures 
because of their potential for corruption. 
The case was brought by Shaun 
McCutcheon, an Alabama man, and the 
Republican National Committee. Mr. 
McCutcheon said he was prepared to abide 
by contribution limits to individual 
candidates and groups, which are currently 
$2,500 per election to federal candidates, 
$30,800 per year to national party 
committees, $10,000 per year to state party 
committees and $5,000 per year to other 
political committees. But he said he objected 
to separate overall two-year limits, currently 
$46,200 for contributions to candidates and 
$70,800 for contributions to groups, arguing 
that they were unjustified and too low. 
He said he had made contributions to 16 
federal candidates in recent elections and 
had wanted to give money to 12 more. He 
said he had also wanted to give $25,000 to 
each of three political committees 
established by the Republican Party. Each 
set of contributions would have put him over 
the overall limits. 
In September, a special three-judge federal 
court in Washington upheld the overall 
limits, saying they were justified by the need 
to prevent the circumvention of the basic 
limits. 
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“Although we acknowledge the 
constitutional line between political speech 
and political contributions grows 
increasingly difficult to discern,” Judge 
Janice Rogers Brown wrote for the court, 
“we decline plaintiffs’ invitation to 
anticipate the Supreme Court’s agenda.” 
In June, in a brief, unsigned 5-to-4 decision, 
the Supreme Court affirmed the Citizens 
United ruling, summarily reversing a 
decision of the Montana Supreme Court that 
had upheld a state law limiting independent 
political spending by corporations. 
“The question presented in this case is 
whether the holding of Citizens United 
applies to the Montana state law,” the 
opinion said. “There can be no serious doubt 
that it does.” Montana’s arguments, the 
opinion continued, “either were already 
rejected in Citizens United, or fail to 
meaningfully distinguish that case.” 
In 2006, in Randall v. Sorell, the Supreme 
Court struck down Vermont’s contribution 
limits, the lowest in the nation, as 
unconstitutional. Individuals and political 
parties were not allowed to contribute more 
than $400 to a candidate for statewide office 
over a two-year election cycle, including 
primaries. In a brief concurrence, Justice 
Samuel A. Alito Jr. said there was no reason 
to address the continuing validity of Buckley 
v. Valeo in that case, suggesting that a later 
case might present the question directly. 
The latest case, McCutcheon v. Federal 
Election Commission, No. 12-536, may be 
that case…
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“Is McCutcheon v. FEC the Next Citizens United?” 
 
Independent Voter Network 
Alex Gauthier 
February 21, 2013 
 
The Supreme Court announced its decision 
Tuesday to hear McCutcheon v. Federal 
Election Commission. It will likely become 
another landmark case defining campaign 
finance and — by extension — the future of 
national elections. 
At stake are contribution limits to state and 
national party committees as well as PACs, 
which are biennially capped at $123,200 in 
aggregate. An individual can donate to many 
different party committees or candidates, but 
cannot exceed an overall donation limit 
which resets every two years. 
McCutcheon’s argument falls along similar 
lines as the Citizens United case. He 
contends his First Amendment rights are 
being infringed upon by not being able to 
donate to as many party committees as he 
would like.  
As it follows, eliminating the biennial 
aggregation restrictions could allow a single 
individual to donate over $1 million to 
political causes in one election cycle — or 
two years — according to Democracy 21′s 
Fred Wertheimer. 
Put simply, national and state/local party 
committees can receive a maximum of 
$32,400 and $10,000, respectively, each 
year from an individual donor. Yet, one 
person cannot exceed the $123,200 limit. 
A ruling in favor of McCutcheon would 
likely remove the biennial aggregation cap. 
In effect, this would raise the maximum 
annual donation limit to around $500,000 
per year, which would nearly quadruple the 
current limit. 
There remains a clear distinction, however, 
between the Citizens United case 
and McCutcheon v FEC. An 
important rationale for the majority opinion, 
authored by Justice Kennedy, was: 
“The governmental interest in preventing 
corruption and the appearance of 
corruption [was] inadequate to justify [the 
ban] on independent expenditures.” 
This might be a key detail in McCutcheon’s 
case. If significantly increasing party 
contribution limits is shown to have a 
corrupting influence or promote the 
appearance of corruption, the Supreme 
Court would rule against him. 
It remains to be seen how party 
contributions will be recognized by the high 
court, since non-coordination between Super 
PACs and candidates was a critical concept 
behind Super PACs being able to infinitely 
raise funds. 
Party committees have traditionally been 
under more scrutiny when it comes to fund 
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raising and were not regarded as 
independent and thereby labeled as 
‘coordinated communications.’ This subjects 
them to stricter regulations. 
Background 
The McCutcheon of McCutcheon v. Federal 
Elections Commission is Shaun McCutcheon 
of Alabama. He is a conservative activist 
and chairman of Conservative Action Fund, 
“a Super PAC that promotes conservative 
Republicans,” according to the Alabama 
GOP.  
Mr. McCutcheon spent $33,088 on 
conservative candidates and committees — 
most of which ($20,000) went to the 
Alabama Republican Party — during the 
2012 elections. Yet, he wants to be able to 
spend more on future elections. 
He is currently prohibited from breaching 
the aggregate limit on biennial committee 
contributions, which is capped at $74,600. 
Looking Ahead 
Although the Republican National 
Committee is also represented in the case, 
both Democratic and Republican Party 
committees are forced to turn down 
donations every year due to these limits. 
This means a decision in favor of the 
plaintiffs could dramatically benefit both 
parties, not only the GOP.  
The law that will be challenged is the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. 
The BCRA, also known as the “McCain-
Feingold Act,” established the current 
biennial limits for donations McCutcheon 
argues are unconstitutional. 
Instrumental to how the Supreme Court will 
decide the McCutcheon case is Buckley v 
Valeo (1976), which is the cornerstone for 
campaign finance law and the primary 
source used to rationalize the infamous 
Citizens United decision. 
Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, 
and Alito ruled in favor of Citizens United 
in the 5-4 decision. The dissenters were 
Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. 
Stevens was replaced by Kagan in 2010, but 
McCutcheon’s free speech argument could 
very well resonate with the previous 
majority, making a ruling in favor of the 
plaintiffs more likely. 
Unsurprisingly, election spending 
watchdogs like the Campaign Legal Center 
are critical of a possible expansion of money 
in politics. Senior counsel for the Campaign 
Legal Center, Tara Malloy, said in a 
statement: 
“It has become readily apparent that there 
are a number of justices who are willing to 
usurp Congress’s role as legislator when it 
comes to matter[s] of campaign finance. An 
aggregate contribution limit was passed in 
the wake of the Watergate money scandals 
and was upheld in the 1976 Supreme Court 
decision Buckley v. Valeo.” 
Even though it is primarily Republicans who 
are backing the plaintiffs, the Democratic 
Party and all political action committees 
would benefit from more relaxed 
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contribution limits. Raising the limit on the 
amount one individual can donate each 
election cycle allows fewer donors to 
contribute more money. 
The decision could not only send 
skyrocketing campaign costs even higher, 
but strengthen party affiliated coffers as 
well, potentially squeezing out third parties 
that don’t have recognized party 
committees.
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“Court Upholds Aggregate Federal Contribution Limits” 
Inside Political Law 
Matthew Connolly 
September 28, 2012 
 
Earlier today, a three-judge panel in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of 
Columbia rejected a constitutional 
challenge to the Federal Election Campaign 
Act’s (“FECA”) biennial aggregate 
contribution limits in McCutcheon v. FEC, 
No. 12-cv-1034 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 
2012).  Under FECA, an individual may 
contribute no more than $117,000 in the 
aggregate on federal elections in a two-year 
election cycle.  There are various complex 
sub-limits within that overall biennial limit. 
Plaintiffs Sean McCutcheon, an Alabama 
resident, and the Republican National 
Committee challenged these aggregate limits 
under the First Amendment as being 
unsupported by a legitimate government 
interest and for being unconstitutionally low. 
 As a preliminary matter, the panel declined 
to apply the more stringent “strict scrutiny” 
standard of review that the Supreme Court 
has recently applied to political expenditure 
limits, including in Citizens United.  Instead, 
the panel applied a more lenient standard, 
finding that contribution limits are valid if 
they are “closely drawn to match a 
sufficiently important interest.”  
 The panel denied plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment challenges, finding that the 
aggregate contribution limits were 
sufficiently tied to the government’s interest 
in preventing corruption.  Specifically, the 
court ruled that aggregate limits were 
necessary to prevent circumvention of 
FECA’s base limits—the maximum amount 
an individual may give to a specific entity, 
such as a candidate, political committee, or 
national party committee (the plaintiffs did 
not challenge the base limits in this case).  
 Having found that the aggregate limits were 
justified, the panel rejected plaintiffs’ claims 
that the aggregate limits are 
unconstitutionally low or overbroad.  The 
panel refused to question the specific limits 
imposed by FECA, finding that courts 
should defer to Congress unless there are 
“danger signs,” which the court determined 
are not present with respect to the aggregate 
limits.  
 The FEC’s victory before the district court 
is a setback to those who have thought the 
biennial limits to be unconstitutional, 
especially in the wake of the Citizens 
United decision.  But the court’s decision 
likely will be appealed, and the issue 
ultimately will be resolved by the Supreme 
Court. 
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“Supreme Court Could Create System of Legalized Bribery in Washington 
Depending on Its Decision in McCutcheon Case” 
 
Huffington Post 
Fred Wertheimer 
February 21, 2013 
 
There are enormous stakes for the country in 
the campaign finance case the Supreme 
Court agreed to review this week. 
If the Supreme Court strikes down the 
existing limits on the aggregate amount an 
individual can give to all federal candidates 
and all party committees in a two-year 
election cycle, the Justices will create a 
system of legalized bribery in Washington. 
Such a decision by the Court would be a 
gold mine for big donors interested in 
buying government decisions and would 
wreak havoc on the interests of ordinary 
Americans. 
McCutcheon v. Federal Election 
Commission, the case to be considered by 
the Supreme Court, involves a challenge by 
Shaun McCutcheon and the Republican 
National Committee to the constitutionality 
of the federal aggregate contribution limits, 
upheld by the Supreme Court in 1976 
in Buckley v. Valeo. 
A decision by the Court to reverse that 
decision would not only strike down the 
aggregate contribution limits enacted in 
1974, but would also eviscerate an essential 
anti-corruption provision enacted in 2002 
and upheld by the Supreme Court in 2003 
in McConnell v. FEC. That provision 
prohibits a federal officeholder or candidate 
from soliciting contributions that do not 
comply with the federal contribution limits, 
including the aggregate limits. 
If the aggregate limits are struck down, 
officeholders would be able to directly 
solicit the huge contributions from 
individual donors that the solicitation ban is 
intended to prohibit. 
The Supreme Court in the 
landmark Buckley case found that a system 
that allowed huge campaign contributions 
was an inherently corrupt system. The Court 
recognized that contribution limits were 
necessary to deal with: 
[T]he reality or appearance of corruption 
inherent in a system permitting unlimited 
financial contributions, even when the 
identities of the contributors and the 
amounts of their contributions are fully 
disclosed.  
The Supreme Court in the McConnell case 
recognized the inherent dangers of 
corruption if federal officeholders are 
allowed to solicit huge contributions from 
donors. In upholding the constitutionality of 
the federal ban on soliciting soft money, the 
Court stated: 
 
Large soft-money donations at a 
candidate’s or officeholder’s behest give 
rise to all of the same corruption 
concerns posed by contributions made 
directly to the candidate or officeholder.  
Though the candidate may not ultimately 
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control how the funds are spent, the 
value of the donation to the candidate or 
officeholder is evident from the fact of 
the solicitation itself.   
 
Even Justice Kennedy, who voted to strike 
down the other restrictions on soft money, 
agreed that the ban on the solicitation of 
large soft money contributions by federal 
officeholders was constitutional. Kennedy 
wrote: 
 
The making of a solicited gift is a quid 
both to the recipient of the money and to 
the one who solicits the payment (by 
granting his request).  Rules governing 
candidates’ or officeholders’ solicitation 
of contributions are, therefore, 
regulations governing their receipt of 
quids.  This regulation fits under 
Buckley’s anti-corruption rationale.  
 
The practical consequences of removing the 
aggregate limits are illustrated by the 
fundraising that took place in the 2012 
presidential elections. 
During the last election, because of the 
aggregate contribution limits, an individual 
could give a maximum total of $70,800 to 
party committees and a maximum total of 
$46,200 to federal candidates in the two-
year election cycle. 
In order to solicit the largest allowable 
check from a donor to support his campaign, 
President Obama established a joint 
fundraising account, the Obama Victory 
Fund. 
The President solicited individual 
contributions for the Fund of up to $75,800 
per donor to support his campaign, the 
maximum a donor could give to his 
campaign and party, which was then divided 
up among the president's campaign, the 
DNC and several state parties. (Republican 
nominee Mitt Romney established a similar 
joint fundraising account.) 
Take away the aggregate limit on individual 
giving to parties and a presidential candidate 
in the 2016 election could solicit individual 
checks from donors of up to $1,194,000 per 
donor to be spent by his party on his 
campaign. 
Similarly, take away the aggregate total 
limit on individual contributions to 
candidates and a House Speaker or Senate 
Majority Leader could solicit individual 
checks from donors of up to $2,433,600 per 
donor to be distributed among their 
congressional candidates up to $5,200 per 
candidate. 
Or, any powerful federal officeholder could 
solicit individual checks from donors of up 
to $3,627,600 per donor for the 
officeholder's party committees and 
congressional candidates. 
It is axiomatic in American politics that 
when it comes to raising campaign money, 
anything that can legally be done will be 
done. 
Thus, President Obama solicited checks for 
$75,800 for his presidential campaign and 
party in 2012, the maximum a donor could 
give. 
Checks in excess of $1 million, $2 million 
and $3 million per donor, the maximums 
that a donor could give, will be solicited by 
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federal officeholders in future elections if 
the aggregate limits on individual 
contributions are struck down by the 
Supreme Court. 
It is simply not possible to have a president 
or any other federal officeholder soliciting 
individual contributions in excess of $1 
million, $2 million or $3 million per donor 
without creating opportunities for the 
corruption of federal officeholders and 
government decisions. 
The Buckley and McConnell Supreme Court 
decisions and Justice Kennedy in his 
concurring opinion in McConnell all 
recognized this reality. 
Despite the profound problems created by 
the Supreme Court's misguided decision in 
the Citizens United case, furthermore, this 
provides no justification for the creation of a 
system of legalized bribery that opens the 
door wide to the corruption of federal 
officeholders and government decisions. 
It is time for this Supreme Court to stop 
acting like a super legislature. 
It is time for this Supreme Court to stop 
issuing radical decisions that overturn 
decades of national policy designed to 
prevent government corruption. A little 
respect by this Supreme Court for the 
constitutional right of citizens and Congress 
to protect the government from corruption is 
in order. 
Citizens deserve no less. 
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U.S. v. Apel 
12-1038 
Ruling Below: U.S. v. Apel, 676 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2012), cert granted, 133 S.Ct. 2767 (2013). 
Appellant John Apel, who was subject to a pre-existing order barring him from Vandenberg Air 
Force Base, was convicted of three counts of trespassing on the base in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1382. After his convictions became final in district court, the Ninth Circuit decided United States 
v. Parker. Parker held that because a stretch of highway running through Vandenberg AFB is 
subject to an easement “granted to the State of California, which later relinquished it to the 
County of Santa Barbara,” the federal government lacks the exclusive right of possession of the 
area on which the trespass allegedly occurred; therefore, a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1382 
could not stand, regardless of an order barring a defendant from the base.  The Ninth Circuit 
therefore reversed Apel’s convictions as a result of the Parker decision. 
Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1382, which prohibits a person from reentering a 
military installation after a commanding officer has ordered him not to reenter, may be enforced 
on a portion of a military installation that is subject to a public roadway easement. 
 
 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, 
v. 
John Dennis APEL, Defendant–Appellant. 
United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, 
v. 
John Dennis Apel, Defendant–Appellant. 
United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, 
v. 
John Dennis Apel, Defendant–Appellant. 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
Decided on April 25, 2012 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
PER CURIAM 
Appellant John Apel, who was subject to a 
pre-existing order barring him from 
Vandenberg Air Force Base, was convicted 
of three counts of trespassing on the base in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1382. After his 
convictions became final in district court, 
we decided United States v. Parker. Parker 
held that because a stretch of highway 
running through Vandenberg AFB is subject 
to an easement “granted to the State of 
California, which later relinquished it to the 
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County of Santa Barbara,” the federal 
government lacks the exclusive right of 
possession of the area on which the trespass 
allegedly occurred; therefore, a conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1382 cannot stand, 
regardless of an order barring a defendant 
from the base.  
Although we question the correctness of 
Parker, it is binding, dispositive of this 
appeal, and requires that Apel's convictions 
be REVERSED. 
 
 
 
  
 303 
“Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Military Protester Case” 
Reuters 
Lawrence Hurley 
June 3, 2013 
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to 
consider whether a protester who was barred 
from a military base in California violated a 
federal law when he took part in 
demonstrations on a public roadway that 
crosses government-owned land. 
The government asked the justices to 
overturn a lower court ruling in favor of the 
protester, John Apel. He successfully argued 
in a federal appeals court that the law, which 
prevents people from re-entering bases after 
they are barred, applies only to land over 
which the military has exclusive authority. 
Apel, who protested against nuclear 
weapons, was barred from Vandenberg Air 
Force Base but continued to attend 
demonstrations outside the base entrance. 
The public roadway on which the protests 
took place is located on land owned by the 
government. Apel was convicted of three 
counts of trespassing on the base. 
The appeals court in San Francisco reversed 
the convictions, ruling that the government 
did not have an exclusive right of possession 
of the area where the alleged trespass took 
place. 
In asking the justices to hear the case, U.S. 
Solicitor General Donald Verrilli wrote in 
court papers that the government "will be 
unable to fully enforce a significant federal 
criminal statute on many military bases" if 
the ruling was left to stand. 
Oral arguments and a ruling are due in the 
court's next term, which begins in October 
and ends in June 2014. 
The case is U.S. v. Apel, U.S. Supreme 
Court, No. 12-1038. 
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National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning 
12-1281 
Ruling Below: Noel Canning v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 705 F.3d 490, (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted, 2013 WL 1774240 (U.S. 2013). 
Noel Canning petitions for review of a National Labor Relations Board decision finding that 
Noel Canning violated sections of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to reduce to 
writing and execute a collective bargaining agreement reached with Teamsters Local 760. NLRB 
cross-petitions for enforcement of its order. On the merits of the NLRB decision, petitioner 
argues that the Board did not properly follow applicable contract law in determining that an 
agreement had been reached and that therefore, the finding of unfair labor practice is erroneous. 
Questions Presented: (1) Whether the President’s recess-appointment power may be exercised 
during a recess that occurs within a session of the Senate, or is instead limited to recesses that 
occur between enumerated sessions of the Senate; (2) whether the President’s recess-
appointment power may be exercised to fill vacancies that exist during a recess, or is instead 
limited to vacancies that first arose during that recess; and (3) whether the President's recess-
appointment power may be exercised when the Senate is convening every three days in pro 
forma sessions. 
 
 
NOEL CANNING, a Division of the Noel Corporation, Petitioner 
v. 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent 
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit 
Decided on January 25, 2013 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
SENTELLE, Chief Judge 
Noel Canning petitions for review of a 
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” 
or “the Board”) decision finding that Noel 
Canning violated section 8(a)(1) and (5) of 
the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”)  by refusing to reduce to writing 
and execute a collective bargaining 
agreement reached with Teamsters Local 
760 (“the Union”).  NLRB cross-petitions 
for enforcement of its order. On the merits 
of the NLRB decision, petitioner argues that 
the Board did not properly follow applicable 
contract law in determining that an 
agreement had been reached and that 
therefore, the finding of unfair labor practice 
is erroneous. We determine that the Board 
issuing the findings and order could not 
lawfully act, as it did not have a quorum, for 
reasons set forth more fully below. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
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At its inception, this appears to be a routine 
review of a decision of the National Labor 
Relations Board over which we have 
jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 
160(e) and (f), providing that petitions for 
review of Board orders may be filed in this 
court. The Board issued its order on 
February 8, 2012. On February 24, 2012, the 
company filed a petition for review in this 
court, and the Board filed its cross-
application for enforcement on March 20, 
2012. While the posture of the petition is 
routine, as it developed, our review is not. In 
its brief before us, Noel Canning 
…questions the authority of the Board to 
issue the order on two constitutional 
grounds. First, petitioner asserts that the 
Board lacked authority to act for want of a 
quorum, as three members of the five-
member Board were never validly appointed 
because they took office under putative 
recess appointments which were made when 
the Senate was not in recess. Second, it 
asserts that the vacancies these three 
members purportedly filled did not “happen 
during the Recess of the Senate,” as required 
for recess appointments by the 
Constitution.  Because the Board must have 
a quorum in order to lawfully take action, if 
petitioner is correct in either of these 
assertions, then the order under review is 
void ab initio.  
Before we can even consider the 
constitutional issues, however, we must first 
rule on statutory objections to the Board's 
order raised by Noel Canning. … We must 
decide whether Noel Canning is entitled to 
relief on the basis of its nonconstitutional 
arguments before addressing the 
constitutional question. Noel Canning raises 
two statutory arguments. First, it contends 
that the ALJ's conclusion that the parties in 
fact reached an agreement at their final 
negotiation session is not supported by 
substantial evidence. Second, it argues that 
even if such an agreement were reached, it is 
unenforceable under Washington law. We 
address each argument in turn. 
A. The Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Refusal to execute a written collective 
bargaining agreement incorporating terms 
agreed upon during negotiations is an unfair 
labor practice under section 8(a)(1) and (5) 
of the NLRA.  Whether the parties reached 
an agreement during negotiations is a 
question of fact.  We therefore must affirm 
the Board's conclusion that an agreement 
was in fact reached if that conclusion is 
supported by substantial evidence.   
Noel Canning and the Union had in the past 
enjoyed a long collective bargaining 
relationship, but the parties were unable to 
reach a new agreement before their most 
recent one expired in April 2010. 
Negotiations began in June 2010. By the 
time the parties met for their final 
negotiation session in December 2010, all 
issues save wages and pensions had been 
resolved. According to notes taken by Union 
negotiators at the parties' final negotiating 
session, the parties agreed to present two 
alternative contract proposals to the Union 
membership: one preferred by Noel Canning 
management and the other by the 
Union. Each proposal included wage and 
pension increases but allocated the increases 
differently. The notes reveal that the Union 
proposal put no limit on the membership's 
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right to decide how much of the $0.40 per 
hour pay increase to allocate to its pension 
fund. According to the notes and Union 
witnesses, the parties agreed that both 
proposals would be submitted to the Union 
membership for a ratification vote and that 
the parties would be bound by the outcome 
of that vote. Union negotiators testified that 
after the parties read aloud the terms of the 
two proposals, Noel Canning's president 
stood and said “let's do it.”… 
The next day, Noel Canning management 
emailed the Union the wage and pension 
terms of the two proposals. According to the 
email, however, the Union proposal capped 
at $0.10 the amount of the $0.40 pay 
increase that the membership could devote 
to its pension fund. The email thus 
conflicted with the Union negotiators' notes, 
which left the allocation question entirely to 
the membership. When the chief Union 
negotiator, Bob Koerner, called Noel 
Canning's president to discuss the 
discrepancy, the president responded that 
since the agreement was not in writing, it 
was not binding. The vote took place 
anyway, and the membership ratified the 
Union's preferred proposal, which allocated 
the entire pay increase to the pension fund. 
Noel Canning posted a letter informing the 
Union that the company considered the 
ratification vote to be a counteroffer, which 
the company rejected, and declared the 
parties to be at an impasse. Noel Canning 
subsequently refused to execute a written 
agreement embodying the terms ratified by 
the Union. 
The Union filed an unfair labor practice 
charge premised on Noel Canning's refusal 
to execute the written agreement. After a 
two-day hearing, the ALJ determined that 
the parties had in fact achieved consensus ad 
idem as to the terms of the Union's preferred 
proposal and that Noel Canning's refusal to 
execute the written agreement constituted an 
unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) 
and (5) of the NLRA. The ALJ ordered Noel 
Canning to sign the collective bargaining 
agreement. Noel Canning timely filed 
exceptions to the ALJ's decision, and the 
Board affirmed. 
Unsurprisingly, the parties' testimony at the 
ALJ hearing conflicted over whether the 
parties in fact agreed to the terms of the 
Union proposal. The ALJ's decision thus 
rested almost entirely on his determination 
of the witnesses' credibility. Assessing the 
conflicting testimony, the ALJ determined 
that because the Union witnesses' testimony 
was corroborated by contemporaneous notes 
taken during the December 2010 negotiation 
session, the Union's witnesses were credible. 
In contrast, he determined that Noel 
Canning's witnesses were not credible …  
We are loath to overturn the credibility 
determinations of an ALJ unless they are 
“hopelessly incredible, self-contradictory, or 
patently insupportable.” Here, the ALJ 
chose the corroborated testimony of Union 
negotiators over the unsupported testimony 
of Noel Canning employees. And given 
undisputed testimony that at least one Noel 
Canning representative took notes of the 
meeting, the ALJ weighed Noel Canning's 
failure to corroborate its testimony against 
it.  
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Noel Canning nevertheless claims that 
Koerner's testimony is plagued by 
inconsistencies. But the inconsistencies and 
contradictions it identifies are either 
irrelevant or merely the result of the 
competing testimony of the two parties' 
witnesses. There is nothing in the Union 
testimony—corroborated by 
contemporaneous notes—that hints at 
hopeless incredibility or self-contradiction. 
Noel Canning thus relies on what it alleges 
to be an inconsistency between Koerner's 
testimony and his affidavit. The affidavit, 
which is not in the record, apparently 
contained the following sentence, referring 
to the parties' tentative agreement as “TA”: 
“I was voting the contract on Wednesday 
and that I would vote what we TA'd during 
the December 8th meeting—noting different 
than TA'd.” When asked at the ALJ hearing 
if he saw any errors in his affidavit, Koerner 
claimed he saw none but struggled to 
explain what the language meant. Noel 
Canning contends that the affidavit is an 
explicit admission that Koerner presented an 
offer to the Union that was materially 
different from the one agreed upon by the 
parties and therefore contradicts his 
testimony. The ALJ rejected Noel Canning's 
interpretation, concluding that the sentence 
suffered from a typographical error—
“noting” should have been “nothing”—and 
that the error accounted for the witness's 
inability to explain the affidavit's meaning.  
We conceive of no reason to disagree. As 
written, the language of the affidavit is 
confusing and becomes intelligible only if 
the typographical error pointed out by the 
ALJ is corrected. Moreover, the ALJ 
specifically determined that the witness was 
confused by the affidavit, not that he was 
trying to conceal deception, as Noel 
Canning contends.  
B. The Enforceability of the Contract 
We also agree with the Board that we lack 
jurisdiction to consider Noel Canning's 
choice of law argument. Section 10(e) of the 
NLRA forbids us from exercising 
jurisdiction to hear any “objection that has 
not been urged before the Board.”  The ALJ 
specifically rejected Noel Canning's 
argument that he should apply Washington 
state law to decide whether the contract 
could be enforced. In its exceptions to the 
Board, however, Noel Canning did not 
mention Washington law. Although Noel 
Canning contended that the ALJ incorrectly 
determined that the parties had in fact 
reached consensus ad idem during 
negotiations, it nowhere argued that the ALJ 
made an incorrect choice of law to govern 
the contracts issue. 
“While we have not required that the ground 
for the exception be stated explicitly in the 
written exceptions filed with the Board, we 
have required, at a minimum, that the 
ground for the exception be evident by the 
context in which the exception is raised.” 
Nothing in Noel Canning's exceptions even 
hints that it objected to the application of 
federal law. On the contrary, it conceded to 
the Board that “[i]t is not in dispute that an 
employer violates [the NLRA] by refusing 
to execute a Collective Bargaining 
Agreement incorporating all of the terms 
agreed upon by the parties during 
negotiations.” We therefore lack jurisdiction 
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to consider Noel Canning's state-law 
argument because its objections were not 
“adequate to put the Board on notice that the 
issue might be pursued on appeal.”  Having 
determined that Noel Canning does not 
prevail on its statutory challenges, 
consideration of the constitutional question 
is unavoidable, and we proceed to its 
resolution. 
Because we agree that petitioner is correct in 
both of its constitutional arguments, we 
grant the petition of Noel Canning for 
review and deny the Board's petition for 
enforcement. 
II. JURISDICTION 
…We note at the outset that there is a 
serious argument to be made against our 
having jurisdiction over the constitutional 
issues. Section 10(e) of the NLRA, 
governing judicial review of the Board's 
judgments and petitions for enforcement, 
provides: “No objection that has not been 
urged before the Board ... shall be 
considered by the court, unless the failure or 
neglect to urge such objection shall be 
excused because of extraordinary 
circumstances.”  The record reflects no 
attempt by petitioner to raise the threshold 
issues related to the recess appointments 
before the Board. Our first question, then, is 
whether this failure to urge the objection 
before the Board comes within the exception 
for “extraordinary circumstances.” We hold 
that it does…. 
 
 
III. THE UNDERLYING 
PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner is a bottler and distributor of 
Pepsi–Cola products and is an employer 
within the terms of the NLRA. As discussed, 
an NLRB administrative law judge 
concluded that Noel Canning had violated 
the NLRA. After Noel Canning filed 
exceptions to the ALJ's findings, a three-
member panel of the Board, composed of 
Members Hayes, Flynn, and Block, affirmed 
those findings in a decision dated February 
8, 2012.  
On that date, the Board purportedly had five 
members. Two members, Chairman Mark G. 
Pearce and Brian Hayes, had been 
confirmed by the Senate on June 22, 2010. It 
is undisputed that they remained validly 
appointed Board members on February 8, 
2012.  
The other three members were all appointed 
by the President on January 4, 2012, 
purportedly pursuant to the Recess 
Appointments Clause of the Constitution. 
The first of these three members, Sharon 
Block, filled a seat that became vacant on 
January 3, 2012, when Board member Craig 
Becker's recess appointment expired.  
The second of the three members, Terence 
F. Flynn, filled a seat that became vacant on 
August 27, 2010, when Peter Schaumber's 
term expired.  The third, Richard F. Griffin, 
filled a seat that became vacant on August 
27, 2011, when Wilma B. Liebman's term 
expired.  
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At the time of the President's purported 
recess appointments of the three Board 
members, the Senate was operating pursuant 
to a unanimous consent agreement, which 
provided that the Senate would meet in pro 
forma sessions every three business days 
from December 20, 2011, through January 
22, 2012. The agreement stated that “no 
business [would be] conducted” during 
those sessions. During the December 23 pro 
forma session, the Senate overrode its prior 
agreement by unanimous consent and passed 
a temporary extension to the payroll tax. 
During the January 3 pro forma session, the 
Senate acted to convene the second session 
of the 112th Congress and to fulfill its 
constitutional duty to meet on January 3.  
Noel Canning asserts that the Board did not 
have a quorum for the conduct of business 
on the operative date, February 8, 2012. 
Citing New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 
which holds that the Board cannot act 
without a quorum of three members, Noel 
Canning asserts that the Board lacked a 
quorum on that date. Noel Canning argues 
that the purported appointments of the last 
three members of the Board were invalid 
under the Recess Appointments Clause of 
the Constitution, Article II, Section 2, 
Clause 3. Because we agree that the 
appointments were constitutionally invalid 
and the Board therefore lacked a quorum, 
we grant the petition for review and vacate 
the Board's order. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
It is undisputed that the Board must have a 
quorum of three in order to take action. It is 
further undisputed that a quorum of three 
did not exist on the date of the order under 
review unless the three disputed members 
(or at least one of them) were validly 
appointed. It is further agreed that the 
members of the Board are “Officers of the 
United States” within the meaning of the 
Appointments Clause of the Constitution, 
which provides that the President “shall 
nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and 
all other Officers of the United States, 
whose Appointments are not herein 
otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by Law.” Finally, it is 
undisputed that the purported appointments 
of the three members were not made “by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.” 
This does not, however, end the dispute. The 
Board contends that despite the failure of the 
President to comply with Article II, Section 
2, Clause 2, he nonetheless validly made the 
appointments under a provision sometimes 
referred to as the “Recess Appointments 
Clause,” which provides that “[t]he 
President shall have Power to fill up all 
Vacancies that may happen during the 
Recess of the Senate, by granting 
Commissions which shall expire at the End 
of their next Session.” Noel Canning 
contends that the putative recess 
appointments are invalid and the Recess 
Appointments Clause is inapplicable 
because the Senate was not in the recess at 
the time of the putative appointments and 
the vacancies did not happen during the 
recess of the Senate. We consider those 
issues in turn. 
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A. The Meaning of “the Recess” 
Noel Canning contends that the term “the 
Recess” in the Recess Appointments Clause 
refers to the intersession recess of the 
Senate, that is to say, the period between 
sessions of the Senate when the Senate is by 
definition not in session and therefore 
unavailable to receive and act upon 
nominations from the President. The Board's 
position is much less clear. It argues that the 
alternative appointment procedure created 
by that Clause is available during 
intrasession “recesses, or breaks in the 
Senate's business when it is otherwise in a 
continuing session. The Board never states 
how short a break is too short, under its 
theory, to serve as a “recess” for purposes of 
the Recess Appointments Clause. This 
merely reflects the Board's larger problem: it 
fails to differentiate between “recesses” and 
the actual constitutional language, “the 
Recess.” 
It is this difference between the word choice 
“recess” and “the Recess” that first draws 
our attention. When interpreting a 
constitutional provision, we must look to the 
natural meaning of the text as it would have 
been understood at the time of the 
ratification of the Constitution.  Then, as 
now, the word “the” was and is a definite 
article.  Unlike “a” or “an,” that definite 
article suggests specificity. As a matter of 
cold, unadorned logic, it makes no sense to 
adopt the Board's proposition that when the 
Framers said “the Recess,” what they really 
meant was “a recess.” This is not an 
insignificant distinction. In the end it makes 
all the difference. 
Six times the Constitution uses some form 
of the verb “adjourn” or the noun 
“adjournment” to refer to breaks in the 
proceedings of one or both Houses of 
Congress. Twice, it uses the term “the 
Recess”: once in the Recess Appointments 
Clause and once in the Senate Vacancies 
Clause. Not only did the Framers use a 
different word, but none of the 
“adjournment” usages is preceded by the 
definite article. All this points to the 
inescapable conclusion that the Framers 
intended something specific by the term “the 
Recess,” and that it was something different 
than a generic break in proceedings. 
The structure of the Clause is to the same 
effect. The Clause sets a time limit on recess 
appointments by providing that those 
commissions shall expire “at the End of 
their [the Senate's] next Session.” Again, the 
Framers have created a dichotomy. The 
appointment may be made in “the Recess,” 
but it ends at the end of the next “Session.” 
The natural interpretation of the Clause is 
that the Constitution is noting a difference 
between “the Recess” and the “Session.” 
Either the Senate is in session, or it is in the 
recess. If it has broken for three days within 
an ongoing session, it is not in “the Recess.” 
It is universally accepted that “Session” here 
refers to the usually two or sometimes three 
sessions per Congress. Therefore, “the 
Recess” should be taken to mean only times 
when the Senate is not in one of those 
sessions. Confirming this reciprocal 
meaning, the First Congress passed a 
compensation bill that provided the Senate's 
engrossing clerk “two dollars per day during 
the session, with the like compensation to 
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such clerk while he shall be necessarily 
employed in the recess.”  
Not only logic and language, but also 
constitutional history supports the 
interpretation advanced by Noel Canning, 
not that of the Board…. 
[T]he Supreme Court has used analogous 
state constitutional provisions to inform its 
interpretation of the Constitution.  For 
example, in Collins v. Youngblood, the 
Court considered several early state 
constitutions in discerning “the original 
understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause” 
because “they appear to have been a basis 
for the Framers' understanding of the 
provision.”  The North Carolina 
Constitution, which contains the state 
constitutional provision most similar to the 
Recess Appointments Clause and thus likely 
served as the Clause's model, supports the 
intersession interpretation. It provides: 
That in every case where any officer, the 
right of whose appointment is by this 
Constitution vested in the General 
Assembly, shall, during their recess, die, or 
his office by other means become vacant, 
the Governor shall have power, with the 
advice of the Council of State, to fill up such 
vacancy, by granting a temporary 
commission, which shall expire at the end of 
the next session of the General Assembly. 
This provision, like the Recess 
Appointments Clause, describes a singular 
recess and does not use the word 
“adjournment.” And an 1819 North Carolina 
Supreme Court case dealing with this 
provision implies that the provision was 
seen as differentiating between “the session 
of the General Assembly” and “the recess of 
the General Assembly.”  
The Board argues that “the Company's view 
would ... upend the established 
constitutional balance of power between the 
Senate and the President with respect to 
presidential appointments.” However, the 
Board's view of “the established 
constitutional balance” is neither so well 
established nor so clear as the Board seems 
to think. In fact, the historical role of the 
Recess Appointments Clause is neither clear 
nor consistent. 
The interpretation of the Clause in the years 
immediately following the Constitution's 
ratification is the most instructive historical 
analysis in discerning the original meaning. 
… With respect to the Recess Appointments 
Clause, historical practice strongly supports 
the intersession interpretation. The available 
evidence shows that no President attempted 
to make an intrasession recess appointment 
for 80 years after the Constitution was 
ratified. The first intrasession recess 
appointment probably did not come until 
1867, when President Andrew Johnson 
apparently appointed one district court judge 
during an intrasession adjournment. … 
Whatever the precise number of putative 
intrasession recess appointments before 
1947, it is well established that for at least 
80 years after the ratification of the 
Constitution, no President attempted such an 
appointment, and for decades thereafter, 
such appointments were exceedingly rare. 
The Supreme Court in Printz v. United 
States, exploring the reach of federal power 
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over the states, deemed it significant that the 
early Congress had not attempted to exercise 
the questioned power.  Paralleling the 
Supreme Court's reasoning in Printz, we 
conclude that the infrequency of intrasession 
recess appointments during the first 150 
years of the Republic “suggests an 
assumed absence of [the] power” to make 
such appointments. … 
While the Board seeks support for its 
interpretation in the practices of more recent 
administrations, we do not find those 
practices persuasive. We note that in INS v. 
Chadha, when the Supreme Court was 
considering the constitutionality of a one-
house veto, it considered a similar argument 
concerning the increasing frequency of such 
legislative veto provisions.  In rejecting that 
argument, the Chadha Court stated that “our 
inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by 
the fact that congressional veto provisions 
are appearing with increasing 
frequency....”  Like the Supreme Court 
in Chadha, we conclude that practice of a 
more recent vintage is less compelling than 
historical practice dating back to the era of 
the Framers…. 
The Constitution's overall appointments 
structure provides additional confirmation of 
the intersession interpretation. The Framers 
emphasized that the recess appointment 
power served only as a stopgap for times 
when the Senate was unable to provide 
advice and consent. Hamilton wrote 
in Federalist No. 67 that advice and consent 
“declares the general mode of appointing 
officers of the United States,” while the 
Recess Appointments Clause serves as 
“nothing more than a supplement to the 
other for the purpose of establishing an 
auxiliary method of appointment, in cases to 
which the general method was inadequate.” 
The “general mode” of participation of the 
Senate through advice and consent served an 
important function: “It would be an 
excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in 
the President, and would tend greatly to 
prevent the appointment of unfit characters 
from State prejudice, from family 
connection, from personal attachment, or 
from a view to popularity.” 
Nonetheless, the Framers recognized that 
they needed some temporary method for 
appointment when the Senate was in the 
recess. At the time of the Constitution, 
intersession recesses were regularly six to 
nine months, and senators did not have the 
luxury of catching the next flight to 
Washington. To avoid government paralysis 
in those long periods when senators were 
unable to provide advice and consent, the 
Framers established the “auxiliary” method 
of recess appointments. But they put strict 
limits on this method, requiring that the 
relevant vacancies happen during “the 
Recess.” It would have made little sense to 
extend this “auxiliary” method to any 
intrasession break, for the “auxiliary” ability 
to make recess appointments could easily 
swallow the “general” route of advice and 
consent. The President could simply wait 
until the Senate took an intrasession break to 
make appointments, and thus “advice and 
consent” would hardly restrain his 
appointment choices at all. 
To adopt the Board's proffered intrasession 
interpretation of “the Recess” would wholly 
defeat the purpose of the Framers in the 
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careful separation of powers structure 
reflected in the Appointments Clause. … In 
short, the Constitution's appointments 
structure—the general method of advice and 
consent modified only by a limited recess 
appointments power when the Senate simply 
cannot provide advice and consent—makes 
clear that the Framers used “the Recess” to 
refer only to the recess between sessions. 
Confirming this understanding of the Recess 
Appointments Clause is the lack of a viable 
alternative interpretation of “the Recess.” 
The first alternative interpretation is that 
“the Recess” refers to all Senate breaks. But 
no party presses that interpretation, and for 
good reason. … 
The second possible interpretation is that 
“the Recess” is a practical term that refers to 
some substantial passage of time, such as a 
ten- or twenty-day break. Attorney General 
Daugherty seemed to abandon the 
intersession interpretation in 1921 and 
adopted this functional interpretation, 
arguing that “[t]o give the word ‘recess' a 
technical and not a practical construction, is 
to disregard substance for form.” Daugherty 
refused to put an exact time on the length of 
the break necessary for a “Recess,” stating 
that “[i]n the very nature of things the line of 
demarcation can not be accurately drawn.”  
We must reject Attorney General 
Daugherty's vague alternative in favor of the 
clarity of the intersession interpretation. As 
the Supreme Court has observed, when 
interpreting “major features” of the 
Constitution's separation of powers, we must 
“establish[ ] high walls and clear distinctions 
because low walls and vague distinctions 
will not be judicially defensible in the heat 
of interbranch conflict.” Thus, the inherent 
vagueness of Daugherty's interpretation 
counsels against it…. 
A third alternative interpretation of “the 
Recess” is that it means any adjournment of 
more than three days pursuant to the 
Adjournments Clause.  This interpretation 
lacks any constitutional basis….  
The fourth and final possible interpretation 
of “the Recess,” advocated by the Office of 
Legal Counsel, is a variation of the 
functional interpretation in which the 
President has discretion to determine that the 
Senate is in recess. This will not do. 
Allowing the President to define the scope 
of his own appointments power would 
eviscerate the Constitution's separation of 
powers. The checks and balances that the 
Constitution places on each branch of 
government serve as “self-executing 
safeguard[s] against the encroachment or 
aggrandizement of one branch at the 
expense of the other.”  … 
The Board's arguments supporting the 
intrasession interpretation are not 
convincing. The Board relies on an Eleventh 
Circuit opinion holding that “the Recess” 
includes intrasession recesses. 
The Evans court explained that 
contemporaneous dictionaries defined 
“recess” broadly as “remission and 
suspension of any procedure.”  The court 
also dismissed the importance of the definite 
article “the,” discounted the Constitution's 
distinction between “adjournment” and 
“Recess” by interpreting “adjournment” as a 
parliamentary action, and emphasized the 
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prevalence of intrasession recess 
appointments in recent years.   
While we respect our sister circuit, we find 
the Evans opinion unconvincing. Initially, 
we note that the Eleventh Circuit's analysis 
was premised on an incomplete statement of 
the Recess Appointments Clause's purpose: 
“to enable the President to fill vacancies to 
assure the proper functioning of our 
government.”  This statement omits a crucial 
element of the Clause, which enables the 
President to fill vacancies only when the 
Senate is unable to provide advice and 
consent.… As written, the Eleventh Circuit's 
statement disregards the full structure of the 
Constitution's appointments provision, 
which makes clear that the recess 
appointments method is secondary to the 
primary method of advice and consent. The 
very existence of the advice and consent 
requirement highlights the incompleteness 
of the Eleventh Circuit's broad statement of 
constitutional purpose. 
Nor are we convinced by the Eleventh 
Circuit's more specific arguments. First, the 
natural meaning of “the Recess” is more 
limited than the broad dictionary definition 
of “recess.” In context, “the Recess” refers 
to a specific state of the legislature, so 
sources other than general dictionaries are 
more helpful in elucidating the term's 
original public meaning.  Indeed, it is telling 
that even the Board concedes that “Recess” 
does not mean all breaks. 
Second, the Eleventh Circuit fails to explain 
the use of the singular “Recess,” and it 
underestimates the significance of the 
definite article “the” preceding “Recess” by 
relying on twentieth-century dictionaries to 
argue that “the” can come before a generic 
term.  Contemporaneous dictionaries treated 
“the” as “noting a particular thing.”  
Third, as the Eleventh Circuit 
acknowledged, the Supreme Court has 
suggested that the Constitution does not in 
fact only use “adjournment” to denote 
parliamentary action. … 
Finally, we would make explicit what we 
have implied earlier. The dearth of 
intrasession appointments in the years and 
decades following the ratification of the 
Constitution speaks far more impressively 
than the history of recent presidential 
exercise of a supposed power to make such 
appointments. Recent Presidents are doing 
no more than interpreting the 
Constitution. While we recognize that all 
branches of government must of necessity 
exercise their understanding of the 
Constitution in order to perform their duties 
faithfully thereto, ultimately it is our role to 
discern the authoritative meaning of the 
supreme law…. 
In short, we hold that “the Recess” is limited 
to intersession recesses. The Board 
conceded at oral argument that the 
appointments at issue were not made during 
the intersession recess: the President made 
his three appointments to the Board on 
January 4, 2012, after Congress began a new 
session on January 3 and while that new 
session continued. Considering the text, 
history, and structure of the Constitution, 
these appointments were invalid from their 
inception. Because the Board lacked a 
quorum of three members when it issued its 
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decision in this case on February 8, 2012, its 
decision must be vacated.  
B. Meaning of “Happen” 
Although our holding on the first 
constitutional argument of the petitioner is 
sufficient to compel a decision vacating the 
Board's order, as we suggested above, we 
also agree that the petitioner is correct in its 
understanding of the meaning of the word 
“happen” in the Recess Appointments 
Clause. The Clause permits only the filling 
up of “Vacancies that may happen during 
the Recess of the Senate.”  Our decision on 
this issue depends on the meaning of the 
constitutional language “that may happen 
during the Recess.” The company contends 
that “happen” means “arise” or “begin” or 
“come into being.” The Board, on the other 
hand, contends that the President may fill up 
any vacancies that “happen to exist” during 
“the Recess.” It is our firm conviction that 
the appointments did not occur during “the 
Recess.” We proceed now to determine 
whether the appointments are also invalid as 
the vacancies did not “happen” during “the 
Recess.” 
In determining the meaning of “happen” in 
the Recess Appointments Clause, we begin 
our analysis as we did in the first issue by 
looking to the natural meaning of the text as 
it would have been understood at the time of 
the ratification of the Constitution.  Upon a 
simple reading of the language itself, we 
conclude that the word “happen” could not 
logically have encompassed any vacancies 
that happened to exist during “the Recess.” 
If the language were to be construed as the 
Board advocates, the operative phrase “that 
may happen” would be wholly unnecessary. 
Under the Board's interpretation, the 
vacancy need merely exist during “the 
Recess” to trigger the President's recess 
appointment power. The Board's 
interpretation would apply with equal force, 
however, irrespective of the phrase “that 
may happen.” Its interpretation therefore 
deprives that phrase of any force. By 
effectively reading the phrase out of the 
Clause, the Board's interpretation once again 
runs afoul of the principle that every phrase 
of the Constitution must be given effect.  
For our logical analysis of the language with 
respect to the meaning of “happen” to be 
controlling, we must establish that it is 
consistent with the understanding of the 
word contemporaneous with the ratification. 
Dictionaries at the time of the Constitution 
defined “happen” as “[t]o fall out; to chance; 
to come to pass.” A vacancy happens, or 
“come[s] to pass,” only when it first arises, 
demonstrating that the Recess Appointments 
Clause requires that the relevant vacancy 
arise during the recess…. 
In addition to the logic of the language, 
there is ample other support for this 
conclusion. First, we repair again to 
examination of the structure of the 
Constitution. If we accept the Board's 
construction, we eviscerate the primary 
mode of appointments set forth in Article II, 
Section 2, Clause 2. It would have made 
little sense to make the primary method of 
appointment the cumbersome advice and 
consent procedure contemplated by that 
Clause if the secondary method would 
permit the President to fill up all vacancies 
regardless of when the vacancy arose…. 
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We further note that the “arise” 
interpretation is consistent with other usages 
of “happen” in the Constitution. Article I, 
Section 3, Clause 2, the Senate Vacancies 
Clause, provides for the filling of vacancies 
in Senate seats. … 
It is well established that “inconsistency 
[within the Constitution] is to be implied 
only where the context clearly requires 
it.”  Our understanding of the plain meaning 
of the Recess Appointments Clause as 
requiring that a qualifying vacancy must 
have come to pass or arisen “during the 
Recess” is consistent with the apparent 
meaning of the Senate Vacancies 
Clause. The interpretation proffered by the 
Board is not. 
As with the first issue, we also find that 
evidence of the earliest understanding of the 
Clause is inconsistent with the Board's 
position. It appears that the first President, 
who took office shortly after the ratification, 
understood the recess appointments power 
to extend only to vacancies that arose during 
senatorial recess….  
In 1792, Edmund Randolph, the first 
Attorney General, addressed the issue of an 
office that had become vacant during the 
session when the Secretary of State sought 
his view. Addressing the vacancy, 
concluding that it did not “happen” during 
the recess, and thereby rejecting the “exist” 
interpretation, Randolph wrote: 
But is it a vacancy which 
has happened during the recess of the 
Senate? It is now the same and no other 
vacancy, than that, which existed on the 2nd. 
of April 1792. It commenced therefore on 
that day or may be said to have happened on 
that day. 
Alexander Hamilton, similarly, wrote that 
“[i]t is clear, that independent of the 
authority of a special law, the President 
cannot fill a vacancy which happens during 
a session of the Senate.” In March 1814, 
Senator Christopher Gore argued that the 
Clause's scope is limited to “vacanc[ies] that 
may happen during the recess of the 
Senate”: 
If the vacancy happens at another time, it is 
not the case described by the Constitution; 
for that specifies the precise space of time 
wherein the vacancy must happen, and the 
times which define this period bring it 
emphatically within the ancient and well-
established maxim: “Expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius.” 
Additional support for the “arise” 
interpretation comes from early interpreters 
who understood that the Clause only applied 
to vacancies where the office had previously 
been occupied, as opposed to vacancies that 
existed because the office had been newly 
created. Justice Joseph Story explained that 
“[t]he word ‘happen’ had relation to some 
casualty,” a statement consistent with the 
arise interpretation.  
We recognize that some circuits have 
adopted the “exist” interpretation.  Those 
courts, however, did not focus their analyses 
on the original public meaning of the word 
“happen.” In arguing that happen could 
mean “exist,” the Evans majority used a 
modern dictionary to define “happen” as 
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“befall,” and then used the same modern 
dictionary to define “befall” as “happen to 
be.”  As the Evans dissent argued, “[t]his is 
at best a strained effort to avoid the available 
dictionary evidence.” A modern cross-
reference is not a contemporary definition. 
The Board has offered no dictionaries from 
the time of the ratification that define 
“happen” consistently with the proffered 
definition of “happen to exist.”… 
The Evans, Woodley, and Allocco courts all 
relied on supposed congressional 
acquiescence in the practice of making 
recess appointments to offices that were 
vacant prior to the recess because 5 U.S.C. § 
5503 permits payment to such appointees in 
some circumstances.  
Section 5503 was passed in 1966. Its similar 
predecessor statute was passed in 1940. The 
enactment of statutes in 1940 and 1966 
sheds no light on the original understanding 
of the Constitution. This is particularly true 
as prior statutes refused payments of salaries 
to all recess appointees whose vacancies 
arose during the session.  We doubt that our 
sister circuits are correct in construing this 
legislation as acquiescent. The Framers 
placed the power of the purse in the 
Congress in large part because the British 
experience taught that the appropriations 
power was a tool with which the legislature 
could resist “the overgrown prerogatives of 
the other branches of government.” The 
1863 Act constitutes precisely that: 
resistance to executive aggrandizement. In 
any event, if the Constitution does not 
empower the President to make the 
appointments, “[n]either Congress nor the 
Executive can agree to waive ... structural 
protection[s]” in the Appointments Clause. 
… The Senate's desires do not determine the 
Constitution's meaning. The Constitution's 
separation of powers features, of which the 
Appointments Clause is one, do not simply 
protect one branch from another.  These 
structural provisions serve to protect 
the people, for it is ultimately the people's 
rights that suffer when one branch 
encroaches on another.…In short, nothing 
in 5 U.S.C. § 5503 changes our view that the 
original meaning of “happen” is “arise.” 
Our sister circuits and the Board contend 
that the “arise” interpretation fosters 
inefficiencies and leaves open the possibility 
of just what is occurring here—that is, a 
Board that cannot act for want for a quorum. 
The Board also suggests more dire 
consequences, arguing that failure to accept 
the “exist” interpretation will leave the 
President unable to fulfill his chief 
constitutional obligation to “take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. 
Const. art. II, § 3, and even suggests that the 
interpretation we adopt today could pose 
national security risks.  But if Congress 
wished to alleviate such problems, it could 
certainly create Board members whose 
service extended until the qualification of a 
successor, or provide for action by less than 
the current quorum, or deal with any 
inefficiencies in some other fashion. And 
our suggestion that Congress can address 
this issue is no mere hypothesis. The two 
branches have repeatedly, and thoroughly, 
addressed the problems of vacancies in the 
executive branch. Congress has provided for 
the temporary filling of a vacancy in a 
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particular executive office by an “acting” 
officer authorized to perform all of the 
duties and exercise all of the powers of that 
office, including key national security 
positions.  Moreover, Congress statutorily 
addressed the filling of vacancies in the 
executive branch not otherwise provided 
for.  
Congress has also addressed the problem of 
vacancies on various multimember agencies, 
providing that members may continue to 
serve for some period past the expiration of 
their commissions until successors are 
nominated and confirmed. … 
Admittedly, Congress has chosen not to 
provide for acting NLRB members.  But that 
choice cannot support the Board's 
interpretation of the Clause. We cannot 
accept an interpretation of the Constitution 
completely divorced from its original 
meaning in order to resolve exigencies 
created by—and equally remediable by—the 
executive and legislative branches. …  
In any event, if some administrative 
inefficiency results from our construction of 
the original meaning of the Constitution, 
that does not empower us to change what the 
Constitution commands. As the Supreme 
Court observed in INS v. Chadha, “the fact 
that a given law or procedure is efficient, 
convenient, and useful in facilitating 
functions of government, standing alone, 
will not save it if it is contrary to the 
Constitution.” It bears emphasis that 
“[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the 
primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of 
democratic government.”   
The power of a written constitution lies in its 
words. It is those words that were adopted 
by the people. When those words speak 
clearly, it is not up to us to depart from their 
meaning in favor of our own concept of 
efficiency, convenience, or facilitation of the 
functions of government. In light of the 
extensive evidence that the original public 
meaning of “happen” was “arise,” we hold 
that the President may only make recess 
appointments to fill vacancies that arise 
during the recess. 
Applying this rule to the case before us, we 
further hold that the relevant vacancies did 
not arise during the intersession recess of the 
Senate. The three Board seats that the 
President attempted to fill on January 4, 
2012, had become vacant on August 27, 
2010, August 27, 2011, and January 3, 2012, 
respectively. On August 27, 2010, the 
Senate was in the midst of an intrasession 
recess, so the vacancy that arose on that date 
did not arise during “the Recess” for 
purposes of the Recess Appointments 
Clause. Similarly, the Senate was in an 
intrasession recess on August 27, 2011, so 
the vacancy that arose on that date also did 
not qualify for a recess appointment. 
The seat formerly occupied by Member 
Becker became vacant at the “End” of the 
Senate's session on January 3, 2012—it did 
not “happen during the Recess of the 
Senate.” First, this vacancy could not have 
arisen during an intersession recess because 
the Senate did not take an intersession recess 
between the first and second sessions of the 
112th Congress. 
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It has long been the practice of the Senate, 
dating back to the First Congress, to 
conclude its sessions and enter “the Recess” 
with an adjournment sine die. The Senate 
has followed this practice even for relatively 
brief intersession recesses.  
Indeed, various acts of Congress refer to the 
adjournment sine die as the conclusion of 
the session. … 
Because, in this case, the Senate declined to 
adjourn sine die on December 30, 2011, it 
did not enter an intersession recess, and the 
First Session of the 112th Congress expired 
simultaneously with the beginning of the 
Second Session.  
Although the December 17, 2011, 
scheduling order specifically provided that 
the Second Session of the 112th Congress 
would convene on January 3, 2012, it did 
not specify when the First Session would 
conclude. And, at the last pro forma session 
before the January 3, 2012, session, the 
Senate adjourned to a date certain: January 
3, 2012.  Because the Senate did not 
adjourn sine die, it did not enter “the 
Recess” between the First and Second 
Sessions of the 112th Congress. Becker's 
appointment therefore expired at the end of 
the First Session on January 3, 2012, and the 
vacancy in that seat could not have 
“happen[ed]” during “the Recess” of the 
Senate. 
Second, in any event, the Clause states that a 
recess appointment expires “at the End of 
[the Senate's] next Session,” not “at the 
beginning of the Senate's next Recess.” 
Likewise, the structure of Article II, Section 
2 supports this reading, for “it makes little 
sense to allow a second consecutive recess 
appointment for the same position, because 
the President and the Senate would have had 
an entire Senate session during the first 
recess appointment to nominate and confirm 
a permanent appointee.”  The January 3, 
2012, vacancy thus did not arise during the 
recess, depriving the President of power to 
make an appointment under the Recess 
Appointments Clause. Because none of the 
three appointments were valid, the Board 
lacked a quorum and its decision must be 
vacated. 
Even if the “End” of the session were 
“during the Recess,” meaning that the 
January 3, 2012, vacancy arose during some 
imaginary recess, we hold that the 
appointment to that seat is invalid because 
the President must make the recess 
appointment during the same intersession 
recess when the vacancy for that office 
arose. The Clause provides that a recess 
appointee's commission expires at “the End 
of [the Senate's] next Session,” which the 
Framers understood as “the end of 
the ensuing session.”  
Consistent with the structure of the 
Appointments Clause and the Recess 
Appointments Clause exception to it, the 
filling up of a vacancy that happens during a 
recess must be done during the same recess 
in which the vacancy arose. There is no 
reason the Framers would have permitted 
the President to wait until some future 
intersession recess to make a recess 
appointment, for the Senate would have 
been sitting in session during the intervening 
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period and available to consider 
nominations….  
As with the first issue, we hold that the 
petitioner's understanding of the 
constitutional provision is correct, and the 
Board's is wrong. The Board had no 
quorum, and its order is void. 
V. THE MOTION FOR 
INTERVENTION 
The Chamber of Commerce and the 
Coalition for a Democratic Workplace seek 
to intervene. It is the law of this circuit that 
litigants seeking to intervene in cases 
involving direct review of administrative 
actions must establish Article III 
standing.  Our judicial power is limited to 
“Cases” or “Controversies,” meaning that 
litigants must show “(1) an injury in fact, (2) 
a causal relationship between the injury and 
the challenged conduct, and (3) a likelihood 
that the injury will be redressed by a 
favorable decision.”  
The movants claim to have “associational 
standing.” In that context, the Supreme 
Court has explained that “an association has 
standing to bring suit on behalf of its 
members when: (a) its members would 
otherwise have standing to sue in their own 
right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are 
germane to the organization's purpose; and 
(c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief 
requested requires the participation of 
individual members in the lawsuit.”  
We need not decide the question of the 
movants' standing. Our precedent is clear: 
“[I]f one party has standing in an action, a 
court need not reach the issue of the 
standing of other parties when it makes no 
difference to the merits of the case.”  
Noel Canning has standing. The case, like 
other petitions for review of administrative 
adjudications, proceeded between the party 
to the administrative adjudication and the 
agency. We reached our decision. The 
motion is now moot, and we order it 
dismissed. The Chamber could have had its 
say by filing as an amicus, but for reasons 
satisfactory to itself, chose to attempt a 
strained claim of intervenor status. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we grant the 
petition of Noel Canning and vacate the 
Board's order. We deny the cross-petition of 
the Board for enforcement of its invalid 
order. 
So ordered. 
GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge, concurring in 
the opinion except as to Part IV.B and 
concurring in the judgment: 
The majority acknowledges that our holding 
on intrasession recess appointments is 
sufficient to vacate the Board's order, and I 
would stop our constitutional analysis there. 
If we need not take up a constitutional issue, 
we should not.  I agree that the Executive's 
view that the President can fill vacancies 
that “happen to exist” during “the Recess” is 
suspect, but that position dates back to at 
least the 1820s, making it more venerable 
than the much more recent practice of 
intrasession recess appointments. We should 
not dismiss another branch's longstanding 
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interpretation of the Constitution when the 
case before us does not demand it. 
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“Supreme Court to Weigh in on Obama’s Recess Appointments” 
Washington Post 
Robert Barnes 
June 24, 2013 
 
The Supreme Court announced Monday that 
it will decide next term whether President 
Obama exceeded his constitutional authority 
by making appointments while the Senate 
was on break last year. 
The case at hand involves Obama’s 
appointment of three members of the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 
but the broader issue concerns the power 
that presidents throughout history have used 
to fill their administrations in the face of 
Senate opposition and inaction. 
The justices will review a broad ruling by a 
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit that upset 
decades of understanding about the 
president’s recess appointment power. The 
court ruled that presidents may make recess 
appointments only between sessions of the 
Senate — they generally come at the end of 
each year — and not when senators take an 
intra-session break. 
Recent presidents have made appointments 
during both kinds of recesses. 
Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr. said 
in a petition to the Supreme Court that the 
appeals court’s reading of the clause would 
“drastically curtail the scope of the 
president’s authority.” 
In addition, the Supreme Court will consider 
a narrower question presented by the 
specifics of Obama’s January 2012 
appointments: whether the president can 
make appointments when the Senate is 
holding pro forma sessions designed to 
thwart such action. 
White House press secretary Jay Carney said 
that he was “confident” that the court will 
uphold Obama’s appointments and that “the 
issue here is about the president having the 
authority that all of his predecessors have 
had to make these recess appointments.” 
Thomas J. Donohue, president of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, welcomed the 
court’s decision to hear the case. “We 
warned last year that by appointing these 
members to the NLRB in such a 
controversial fashion, a cloud of uncertainty 
covered the agency and its work,” he said. 
Obama has used the recess appointments 
power fairly modestly compared with recent 
predecessors. But he went where no other 
president had gone in his appointment of the 
three NLRB members and his appointment 
of Richard Cordray to head the fledgling 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 
Senators had gone home, but the Senate was 
holding pro forma sessions by convening 
with one senator every three days. 
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The White House justified appointing the 
NLRB members by reasoning that the 
Senate actually was in recess because it was 
not available to fulfill its advice-and-consent 
role by conducting business. 
A challenge brought by a Pepsi bottler in the 
state of Washington and backed by the U.S. 
Chamber went to the D.C. Circuit. But in 
January, the unanimous panel skipped past 
the question of pro forma sessions for a far 
broader ruling. 
D.C. Circuit Judge David B. Sentelle wrote 
that the administration’s interpretation of 
when recess appointments may be made 
would give the president “free rein to 
appoint his desired nominees at any time he 
pleases, whether that time be a weekend, 
lunch, or even when the Senate is in session 
and he is merely displeased with its 
inaction.” 
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“U.S.: Limit Appointment Power Review” 
SCOTUS Blog 
Lyle Denniston 
June 7, 2013 
 
The Obama administration has urged the 
Supreme Court to limit its review of the 
President’s constitutional power to 
temporarily fill vacancies in government 
offices, saying that the Justices should not 
take on an added question not yet ruled on 
by any lower court.  Even so, it conceded 
that it is up to the Court to choose the scope 
of its review. 
The new argument on how far the Court 
should go came late Thursday as 
administration lawyers filed their reply 
brief in National Labor Relations Board v. 
Noel Canning (docket 12-1281).  The 
Justices are scheduled to consider at their 
June 20 Conference whether they will hear 
the case at all, and what issues they would 
address if the case is set for review next 
Term. 
When the administration first took the case 
to the Supreme Court in April, it asked the 
Justices to rule on the two issues on which 
appointments to the NLRB had failed in the 
D.C. Circuit: whether the President may 
make temporary appointments to vacant 
posts only at the end of the Senate’s annual 
sessions or also during other breaks in 
sessions, and whether the President could 
fill a post that became open at any time 
during an annual session or only those that 
became vacant in the end-of-session periods. 
Noel Canning, a soft drink bottling company 
in Yakima, Washington, notified the Court 
last month that it did not oppose Supreme 
Court review of those issues, but it asked the 
Court to tack on a third question: may the 
President ever make a recess appointment 
when the Senate is returning to meet every 
three days, even if it does little or no 
business in such a sitting? 
That question is essential, the company’s 
attorneys argued, because it is the one 
question that would settle whether the 
specific appointments made by President 
Obama to the NLRB were constitutional; 
those were made when the Senate was 
holding “pro forma” sessions — with maybe 
only a single senator in the chamber and 
little or nothing was getting done.   Such 
recurring formal gatherings should never 
amount to a recess that creates an 
opportunity for the President to make an 
appointment, Noel Canning contended. 
While this case was being reviewed by the 
D.C. Circuit, both sides had taken positions 
on whether such sessions eliminated the 
existence of any recess, but, in the end, the 
Circuit Court did not role on that.   U.S. 
Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., in 
the NLRB’s new reply brief, pointed out that 
fact. 
“That question,” the brief said, “was not 
resolved by the court of appeals, and it has 
not yet been resolved by any court.”   It 
might possibly come up in other cases now 
pending in lower courts, Verrilli conceded, 
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but has not yet been discussed in a final 
ruling at that level. 
It has long been the Court’s practice, the 
brief noted, that it does not allow itself to be 
the first to pass upon a constitutional 
matter.   If the Court did seek in this case to 
define whether pro forma sessions defeat the 
existence of a recess, the brief went on, that 
would only prolong the threat to presidential 
appointment powers that already existed 
under the Circuit Court ruling.   That would 
not eliminate the dispute among courts of 
appeals on the issues that the government 
seeks to have reviewed, the document 
added. 
The Solicitor General, however, went on to 
suggest that this additional issue might 
actually arise if a lower court were to rule on 
it in one of the other pending cases, before 
the Supreme Court could get to the Noel 
Canning case next Term. 
If the Court were inclined “to use this case 
to decide what effect pro-forma sessions of 
the Senate have on the existence of a 
recess,” Verrilli wrote, it should add that 
question at the time it granted review of the 
government’s petition.  That would put 
everyone on notice that they should address 
that issue, too, in the written briefing.   If it 
does so, lawyers should be given added 
space in their merits briefs to discuss that 
and the issues the Solicitor General has 
raised, the brief commented. 
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“Court Ruling Upsets Conventional Wisdom on Recess Appointments” 
NPR 
Carrie Johnson 
January 25, 2013 
 
In a bombshell decision on the limits of 
executive power, a federal appeals court 
panel in Washington, D.C., has invalidated 
President Obama's recess appointments to 
the National Labor Relations Board. 
Legal experts say the court's reasoning 
upends decades of conventional wisdom and 
deals a big victory to Senate Republicans in 
an era of congressional gridlock. 
The case was brought by a Pepsi-Cola 
bottling company in a fight with a union. 
The company, Noel Canning, sued to 
challenge a decision by the Labor Relations 
Board, arguing that three board members 
were appointed in violation of the U.S. 
Constitution. 
Without those three members — who 
arrived in January 2012 after Obama 
bypassed the Senate — the board would 
have no quorum and would essentially be 
out of business. 
"We have a system of rules in this country 
that confine executive power, and the courts 
stand ready to enforce those lines when 
they're crossed," said Noel Francisco, a 
lawyer at the Jones Day firm who argued the 
case for the company and the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce. 
The judges on the appeals court panel — all 
named by Republican presidents — 
answered two big questions. 
"The first," Francisco said, "is when is the 
recess appointment power triggered in the 
first place? And there what the court said 
was that it only is triggered during 
intersession recesses." 
By that, he means recesses between sessions 
of Congress — not those short breaks so 
common these days. 
The court added that the Senate, not the 
president, got to decide what it meant by a 
recess. 
"Allowing the President to define the scope 
of his own appointments power would 
eviscerate the Constitution's separation of 
powers," wrote Judge David Sentelle for the 
court majority. "An interpretation of 'the 
Recess' that permits the President to decide 
when the Senate is in recess would demolish 
the checks and balances inherent in the 
advice-and-consent requirement, giving the 
President free rein to appoint his desired 
nominees at any time he pleases, whether 
that time be a weekend, lunch, or even when 
the Senate is in session and he is merely 
displeased with its inaction. This cannot be 
the law." 
Senate Republicans raced to embrace the 
decision, which came only a day after 
lawmakers reached a compromise on the use 
of the filibuster. Senate Minority Leader 
Mitch McConnell of Kentucky intervened in 
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the lawsuit along with more than 40 other 
senators. 
Sen. Mike Lee of Utah, who refused to vote 
for any other Obama nominees after the 
recess appointments last year, called it a 
"vindication of the principled stand I have 
taken." 
The court's next holding went even further, 
lawyer Francisco said, to cover "what types 
of vacancies are eligible for recess 
appointments in the first place." 
Two judges on the panel, Sentelle and Karen 
LeCraft Henderson, said under their reading 
of the Constitution, the vacancy had to 
actually arise during the recess, or else no 
dice. 
The third judge, Thomas Griffith, said the 
court didn't need to go that far. He pointed 
out that until Friday's ruling, the 
understanding about the kinds of vacancies 
open to recess appointments dated all the 
way back to the 1820s. 
"We should not dismiss another branch's 
longstanding interpretation of the 
Constitution when the case before us does 
not demand it," Griffith said. 
John Elwood, a Washington lawyer who has 
studied the recess appointment power for 
years, called this "a very, very broad ruling 
that, if it stands, will significantly diminish 
the president's recess appointment power." 
Elwood, now at the Vinson & Elkins law 
firm, said the decision unsettles decades of 
conventional wisdom about the practice, 
which has been used by both Republican 
and Democratic presidents at least 280 times 
to get around Senate gridlock and appoint 
agency heads and other executive branch 
officials. 
The ruling also puts a legal cloud over more 
than 100 actions the Labor Relations Board 
has taken since last year. But legal experts 
say each company involved would have to 
file its own lawsuit to throw out those 
actions, which could take some time. 
The uncertainty extends to the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, whose leader, 
Richard Cordray, was appointed on the same 
day as the NLRB members. 
Sam Kazman, a lawyer who represents a 
plaintiff in a lawsuit challenging the 
constitutionality of the Dodd-Frank financial 
overhaul and the creation of the financial 
protection bureau, said, "We're confident 
that Mr. Cordray's appointment will meet 
the same fate as those NLRB members. 
They will be remembered as the Not-So-Fab 
Four of the Appointments Clause." 
White House spokesman Jay Carney said the 
president "strongly but respectfully 
disagrees with the ruling." 
"It basically calls into question 150 years of 
precedent," Carney told reporters Friday 
afternoon. 
The Justice Department had no immediate 
word on an appeal. But Lynn Rhinehart, the 
general counsel at the AFL-CIO, had this to 
say: "This is one decision that we think is so 
far out there that we really expect to see it 
reversed." 
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The decision conflicts with a holding by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit in 
Atlanta, and lawyers for both sides expect 
the case to wind up in the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
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“Employers Embrace Noel Canning on NLRB Recess Appointments” 
Daily Report 
Frederick L. Warren 
April 16, 2013 
 
In Noel Canning v. NLRB, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that 
President Obama's three January 2012 recess 
appointments to the National Labor 
Relations Board were invalid, resulting in an 
absence of a quorum for the NLRB to 
conduct business. The case, arising in a 
period of heightened political and legal 
battles concerning the NLRB, elevated a 
labor dispute to a constitutional issue headed 
for the U.S. Supreme Court with potentially 
far-reaching repercussions. 
Putting the more than 600 decisions issued 
by the board since the January 2012 recess 
appointments subject to question, Noel 
Canning has already had substantial effects. 
Employers are filing petitions for review of 
board decisions in the D.C. Circuit, which 
has held board cases before it in abeyance 
pending further order of the court. 
Employers have also raised the Noel 
Canning defense as challenges to decisions 
of the board in other circuit courts. 
Employers have argued that Noel Canning's 
rationale applies to Craig Becker's recess 
appointment, which expired in January 
2012. If his appointment were invalid, that 
means board decisions were made without a 
quorum back to August 2011, when the term 
of Wilma Liebman expired, and also are in 
question. 
To put Noel Canning in context, it helps to 
understand the controversy concerning the 
NLRB, the regulatory agency administering 
the National Labor Relations Act. It has five 
board members, serving terms of five years, 
who are nominated by the president subject 
to confirmation by the Senate. The board 
protects employees' rights to organize and 
acts to prevent and remedy unfair labor 
practices. Additionally, the board acts as a 
quasi-judicial body in deciding cases on the 
basis of records in administrative 
proceedings. 
Board decisions are not self-enforcing. The 
NLRA allows the board to petition a federal 
court of appeals for enforcement. A party 
aggrieved by a final board order may 
petition for review in applicable circuit 
courts, including the D.C. Circuit. 
Largely for political reasons, the Senate has 
not voted on some nominations made by 
both Democratic and Republican presidents. 
Consequently, the board regularly has 
operated with fewer than five members. 
Presidents have made recess appointments 
when the Senate has failed to act on 
nominations. 
In 2010's New Process Steel v. NLRB, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the NLRB must 
have a quorum of at least three members to 
conduct business. The board had operated 
from January 2008 to March 2010 with only 
two members due to the Senate's failure to 
confirm nominees. During that time, 
approximately 550 cases were decided by 
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the board, but ultimately only about 100 
two-member decisions were returned to the 
board for new decisions to be issued. 
There is a widespread perception in the 
business community that Obama's board has 
been particularly pro-labor in its actions and 
decisions. One of his recess appointments 
was Becker, whose appointment expired on 
Jan. 3, 2012, which would have resulted in 
the board being reduced to two members 
again. But on Jan. 4, 2012, Obama made 
three recess appointments to the board: 
Sharon Block to fill Becker's seat, Terence 
Flynn to fill a seat that became vacant in 
August 2010 and Richard Griffin to fill a 
seat that became vacant in August 2011. At 
the same time, Obama made a recess 
appointment of Richard Cordray as the first 
director of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau. 
In a political maneuver to prevent Obama 
from making recess appointments after 
Congress started a holiday break in 
December 2011, the Senate held pro forma 
sessions every three business days through 
Jan. 23, 2012. During the Senate's Jan. 3 pro 
forma session, the Senate acted to convene 
the second session of the 112th Congress. 
The facts in Noel Canning are 
straightforward. Teamsters Local 760, which 
represents workers at the Yakima, Wash., 
plant owned by Noel Canning Corp., a 
bottler and distributor of Pepsi products, 
filed an unfair labor practice charge with the 
NLRB. The board issued a decision on Feb. 
8, 2012, finding that the company had 
unlawfully refused to execute a written 
collective-bargaining agreement 
incorporating the terms agreed upon during 
negotiations. The company filed a petition 
for review in the D.C. Circuit. The court 
found that substantial evidence supported 
the board's conclusion that an agreement 
was reached and the company unlawfully 
refused to execute it. 
However, Noel Canning's constitutional 
challenge set the stage for the NLRB's 
upheaval. The company raised an argument 
that the board lacked authority to issue a 
decision for want of a quorum, as three 
members were not validly appointed 
because the recess appointments were made 
when the Senate was not in recess. The 
company also argued that the vacancies 
these three members filled did not become 
vacant, or "happen during the Recess of the 
Senate," as required by the recess-
appointments clause of the Constitution. 
As a threshold matter, the court questioned 
whether it had jurisdiction because the 
company had made no attempt to raise the 
issues related to the recess appointments 
before the board. The section of the NLRA 
governing judicial review of board decisions 
says: "No objection that has not been urged 
before the Board … shall be considered by 
the court, unless the failure or neglect to 
urge such objection shall be excused 
because of extraordinary circumstances." 
The court held that the company's failure to 
raise the objection before the board fell 
within the exception because a constitutional 
challenge to the board's composition was an 
extraordinary circumstance. 
The recess-appointments clause provides 
that "[t]he President shall have Power to fill 
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up all Vacancies that may happen during the 
Recess of the Senate, by granting 
Commissions which shall expire at the End 
of their next Session." The company argued 
that the term "the Recess" refers only to the 
intersession recess of the Senate, which is 
the period between sessions of the Senate. 
The board countered that the recess 
appointment procedure is available during 
intrasession recesses or breaks in the 
Senate's business when it is otherwise in 
session. 
The court agreed with the company that the 
term "the Recess" refers only to the 
intersession recess of the Senate and not to 
adjournments during a session. The court 
also said that the history and interpretation 
of the clause at the time of the adoption of 
the Constitution and the years immediately 
following the Constitution's ratification 
supported its conclusion. 
Second, the court held that the meaning of 
the word "happen" in the clause requires that 
the vacancy actually arises or occurs during 
the recess between sessions. The court 
rejected the board's arguments that "happen" 
means happens to exist during the recess, 
regardless of when the vacancy began. 
In reaching its decision, the D.C. Circuit 
considered and rejected an earlier decision 
of the Eleventh Circuit reaching opposite 
conclusions. In Evans v. Stephens, the 
Eleventh Circuit ruled on constitutional 
challenges to the recess appointment of 
William Pryor to that court by President 
Bush in February 2004 while the Senate 
took a break in its session. 
In Evans, the Eleventh Circuit started its 
analysis by saying that when a president is 
acting under color of express authority of 
the Constitution, the court starts with a 
presumption that his acts are constitutional. 
The presumption is rebuttable. However, the 
challengers must overcome it and persuade 
the court to the contrary. Simply showing 
that there are plausible interpretations of the 
Constitution different from the president's is 
not enough. 
Looking at the language of the Constitution, 
the nation's history, and the purpose of the 
recess-appointments clause—to keep 
important offices filled and government 
functioning when the Senate is not in 
session—the court ruled that "recess" in the 
clause can refer to intrasession as well as 
intersession recesses of the Senate. 
Similarly, the court concluded that "happen" 
is open to more than one interpretation. It 
could mean happen to be or exists. The court 
found that to be the more acceptable 
interpretation. Two other circuit courts 
similarly have interpreted "happen" to mean 
"exists" rather than "arises": U.S. v. 
Woodley (9th Cir. 1985) and U.S. v. 
Allocco (2d Cir. 1962). 
Board Chairman Mark Pearce announced 
after the Noel Canning ruling that the board 
disagreed with it and would continue 
business as usual. In February, Obama 
renominated Sharon Block and Richard 
Griffin to the board. The board comprises 
Block, Griffin and Pearce, whose term 
expires in August. Last week, Obama 
renominated Pearce to another term and 
nominated Harry Johnson III and Philip 
Miscimarra to round out the board. 
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The NLRB decided not to seek en banc 
rehearing by the D.C. Circuit in Noel 
Canning and has announced that it intends 
to file a petition for certiorari with the 
Supreme Court. The petition for certiorari is 
due April 25. If the Supreme Court accepts 
the case, it may not agree with the D.C. 
Circuit's conclusion that the extraordinary-
circumstances exception applies, which 
would allow the court to reach the 
constitutional issues not raised with the 
board. It is also unclear whether the court 
would adopt the Eleventh Circuit's 
presumption of constitutionality regarding 
the president's actions. 
A challenge to Richard Cordray's recess 
appointment to the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau,State National Bank of 
Big Spring v. Jacob J. Lew, is pending in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia, where Noel Canning is binding. 
A Supreme Court decision could affect the 
balance of power between the president and 
the Senate regarding presidential 
appointments and, at least from a historical 
perspective, the composition of the court 
itself. Almost a dozen justices were initially 
placed on the court through recess 
appointments, including Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr., Earl Warren, William Brennan 
and Potter Stewart. The last president to 
make such recess appointments was Dwight 
Eisenhower.
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“A Judicial Atrocity” 
The New Yorker 
Jeffrey Toobin 
January 29, 2013 
 
Right-wing judicial activism has been 
ascendant in recent years. Five years ago, in 
the case of District of Columbia v. Heller, 
the Supreme Court, rewrote decades of 
Second Amendment jurisprudence to thwart 
local legislators who passed gun control 
laws. Three years ago, in Citizens United, a 
majority of the Justices overturned decades 
of precedent to deregulate modern campaign 
financing. But even these decisions, and 
others like them, pale beside last week’s 
extravagant act of judicial hubris by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit. There, in Canning v. National Labor 
Relations Board, three federal 
judges revealed themselves as Republican 
National Committeemen in robes. 
The facts of the case were straightforward. 
The N.L.R.B. is supposed to have five 
members, and it cannot act without a 
quorum of three. After Republicans in the 
Senate obstructed the nominations of 
President Obama’s three nominees to the 
board (a fact not mentioned, revealingly 
enough, in the opinion), the President made 
so-called recess appointments to fill the 
vacancies. 
Recess appointments, which are specifically 
authorized in the Constitution, have been 
facts of political life for decades. When 
faced with senators’ refusals to act on 
nominations Presidents simply made 
appointments while the Senate was not in 
session. There was some political 
controversy about whether they should 
exercise this power, but no legal challenge 
to their right to do so. 
As the Times reported (but the D.C. Circuit, 
once again, did not see fit to mention), 
President Bill Clinton made a hundred and 
thirty-nine recess appointments, while 
George W. Bush made a hundred and 
seventy-one, including those of John R. 
Bolton as Ambassador to the United Nations 
and two appeals-court judges, William H. 
Pryor, Jr., and Charles W. Pickering, Sr., 
Obama has made only thirty-two such 
appointments, including that of Richard 
Cordray as director of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau. 
The D.C. Circuit nevertheless found that 
Obama’s appointment of the three N.L.R.B. 
members was invalid. According to the 
court’s tortured reasoning, the Senate was 
not really “in recess” when the three were 
named. Indeed, the opinion essentially said 
that the Senate need almost never be in 
recess; a handful of senators could create 
“pro-forma” sessions that would trump any 
President’s ability to make appointments. 
Even beyond that, the opinion more or less 
removed the President’s ability to use recess 
appointments in all but a small handful of 
cases, suggesting that the vacancies would 
have to occur, not just remain unfilled, 
during recesses. The appointments of not 
only the N.L.R.B. commissioners but also of 
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Cordray, and all of the actions of his new 
organization, are now in clear jeopardy. 
So, who cares? Why does this dispute about 
an obscure constitutional provision matter? 
And who benefits from the court’s decision? 
The decision matters because it is a huge gift 
to the contemporary Republican Party—
especially to Republican senators. Senate 
Republicans have engaged in an 
unprecedented level of obstruction of 
President Obama’s nominations—to 
executive-branch positions, to independent 
agencies, and especially to federal 
judgeships. Recess appointments have given 
Obama a small degree of leverage to fight 
back. Characteristically, he hasn’t used this 
power much, especially compared with his 
predecessors; Obama has tried to negotiate 
his way out of the problem, with little to 
show for it. But the D.C. Circuit decision, if 
it stands, essentially gives veto power to 
Senate Republicans. If they simply refuse to 
act on Obama’s appointments, he is now 
powerless to respond. The opinion also said 
that any action taken by improper recess 
appointees would be invalid. So the opinion 
could paralyze a major chunk of the federal 
government. Filibusters by senators who 
don’t approve of the United Nations could 
prevent us from having any ambassador at 
all; indeed, these senators could theoretically 
leave a President without any Cabinet 
members at all. 
Who wrote this judicial atrocity? No 
surprise—it was David Sentelle, who has a 
long and disgraceful reputation as a partisan 
hack on the bench. A protégé of Jesse 
Helms, his fellow North Carolinian, Sentelle 
is most famous for engineering, in 1994, the 
dismissal of Robert Fiske as the Whitewater 
Independent Counsel and replacing him with 
Kenneth Starr. (How’d that work out?) As a 
judge, Sentelle has been a thoroughgoing 
reactionary for thirty years. He was joined in 
his opinion by two fellow Republican 
appointees to the D.C. Circuit. 
Where, one might ask, were President 
Obama’s appointees to the D.C. Circuit, 
often described as the second most 
important court in the country? After four-
plus years as President, Obama has 
succeeded in placing exactly zero judges on 
this court. The reasons for this absence 
reflect the strange record of this President on 
judicial appointments. To some extent, 
Obama has simply been asleep at this 
particular switch, nominating judges late or 
not at all. Obama did nothing while D.C. 
Circuit vacancies lingered, before finally 
nominating Caitlin Halligan, a widely 
respected New York prosecutor. Halligan, in 
turn, was shamefully filibustered by the 
Republicans in the Senate, like so many 
other Obama appointees. Obama has 
resubmitted Halligan, along with another 
excellent nominee, Sri Srinivasan, to the 
Senate—where they languish. Thanks to 
Sentelle’s decision to take senior status, 
there are now four vacancies on the D.C. 
Circuit. Obama’s lassitude plus the 
Republicans’ obstruction equals decisions 
like this one on recess appointments. 
The Obama Administration will surely 
challenge the Sentelle ruling—either before 
the full court of appeals or in the Supreme 
Court. Like the health-care decision, this one 
is so terrible that it might stir even some 
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Republican judges to overturn it. Some day, 
of course, there will be a Republican 
President, and this decision will give Senate 
Democrats the chance to cripple him or her, 
too. John G. Roberts, Jr., and Samuel A. 
Alito, Jr., both started in government during 
the Reagan Administration; they have a real 
appreciation for executive power, and they 
may resist giving the Senate unlimited 
power to make mischief. Or they, like 
Sentelle, may simply want to cripple a 
Democratic President now and worry about 
Republican Presidents when the time comes. 
In any event, the D.C. Circuit’s decision is a 
useful reminder of where power resides in 
Washington. Presidents come and go, but 
the judges are there forever. And they know 
it. 
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“Passport Law on Jerusalem Unconstitutional, Federal Appeals Court Says” 
Fox News 
July 23, 2013 
A federal appeals court Tuesday declared 
unconstitutional a law allowing Americans 
born in Jerusalem to list Israel as their 
birthplace on their U.S. passports, the latest 
ruling in a case that stretches back a decade. 
The three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
said that the 2002 law impermissibly 
infringes on the president's exercise of the 
power to recognize foreign governments. 
The case was brought by parents of an 
American boy named Menachem 
Zivotofsky, who was born in a Jerusalem 
hospital soon after the law was passed. The 
parents wanted to list Israel as his birthplace, 
but the U.S. has refused to recognize any 
nation's sovereignty over Jerusalem since 
Israel's creation in 1948 -- so the boy's U.S. 
passport only says "Jerusalem" as his 
birthplace. 
The Bush administration said Congress may 
not tell the president what to do regarding 
this aspect of foreign relations, and the 
Obama administration has taken the same 
position. Longstanding U.S. foreign policy 
that says the status of Jerusalem should be 
resolved in negotiations between Israel and 
the Palestinians. 
Tuesday's opinion, written by Judge Karen 
LeCraft Henderson, an appointee of 
President George H.W. Bush, took a long 
look at the history of the president's power 
to recognize other countries. 
"Beginning with the administration of our 
first president, George Washington, the 
executive has believed that it has the 
exclusive power to recognize foreign 
nations," she wrote. 
Henderson included several examples of 
presidents asserting authority over Congress 
in this area, including the Senate 
consideration of a 1919 resolution 
recommending withdrawing recognition of 
the Mexican government. President 
Woodrow Wilson wrote a letter to Congress 
that if the resolution were to pass, it would 
"constitute a reversal of our constitutional 
practice which might lead to very grave 
confusion in regard to the guidance of our 
foreign affairs" because "the initiative in 
directing the relations of our government 
with foreign governments is assigned by the 
Constitution to the executive, and to the 
executive, only." The chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee quickly 
declared the resolution "dead." 
In addition, Henderson wrote, the Supreme 
Court has more than once said that the 
recognition power lies exclusively with the 
president. 
She said the passport law "runs headlong 
into a carefully calibrated and longstanding 
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executive branch policy of neutrality toward 
Jerusalem." 
The law was part of a large foreign affairs 
bill that President George W. Bush signed 
into law. But even as he did so, Bush issued 
a signing statement in which he said that 
"U.S. policy regarding Jerusalem has not 
changed." 
Henderson said that the purpose of the 
passport law was to alter U.S. foreign policy 
toward Jerusalem, noting its title is "United 
States Policy with Respect to Jerusalem as 
the Capital of Israel." 
Henderson was joined by Judge Judith W. 
Rogers, an appointee of President Bill 
Clinton. The third judge, David S. Tatel, 
also a Clinton appointee, filed a concurring 
opinion in which he said he fully concurred 
in the court's opinion, but wanted to 
"elucidate my thinking about the important 
and novel separation-of-powers question this 
case presents." 
The attorney for the Zivotofskys, Nathan 
Lewin, said in a statement that he'll try to 
get the case heard in the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
"We hope that before Menachem 
Zivotofsky's bar mitzvah he will be able to 
bear a passport that recognizes his birthplace 
as `Israel,"' Lewin wrote. Jewish boys have 
their bar mitzvah at the age of 13. 
The lawsuit was filed back in 2003, and a 
judge said it was a political question for 
Congress and the president to work out 
without the intervention of the courts.  A 
three-judge appeals court panel -- made up 
of different judges than the panel which 
decided the case Tuesday --  agreed that it 
had no authority to consider the claim. 
But the Supreme Court last year overturned 
the ruling and sent the case back down to the 
appeals court to decide whether the law was 
constitutional. 
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“Will ‘Israel’ Passport Case Return to the Supreme Court?” 
Washington Jewish Week 
July 25, 2013 
An attorney for Washington-area residents 
Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky says he plans to 
file a petition to the Supreme Court within 
90 days, after a federal appeals court this 
week upheld the State Department’s refusal 
to list “Israel” as the country of birth for 
their Jerusalem-born son, Menachem, 11. 
 
Congress in 2002 passed a law mandating 
the listing of “Israel” should Americans born 
in Jerusalem request it. But the State 
Department has not complied, arguing the 
law impinges on the executive branch’s 
foreign policy prerogative. 
 
The Supreme Court last year had remanded 
the case of Zivotofsky v. the Secretary of 
State to the court of appeals to decide 
whether the president must follow the 
congressional directive. 
 
On July 23, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia ruled that to list Israel 
“runs headlong into a carefully calibrated 
and longstanding executive branch policy of 
neutrality toward Jerusalem.” 
 
Now, Zivotofsky attorney Nathan Lewin 
wants to return the case to the Supreme 
Court. “I think they would agree to hear the 
case again and decide it,” he told WJW. 
 
The next step after he files the petition is the 
government’s response. “The case probably 
won’t be heard until January or February 
2014,” he said. 
 
Jewish groups, some of whom had filed 
friend of the court briefs on behalf of the 
Zivotofskys, were largely critical of the 
ruling. 
 
Conference of Presidents of Major 
American Jewish Organizations Chairman 
Robert Sugarman and Executive Vice 
Chairman Malcolm Hoenlein called the 
decision “disappointing” and expressed the 
“hope [that] the administration will 
reconsider the issue… . We hope that the 
Supreme Court will reverse this policy that 
discriminates singularly against Israel, and 
will afford those born in Jerusalem the same 
right accorded to those born elsewhere.” 
 
U.S. Rep. Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.) said the 
ruling “not only flies in the face of basic 
geography, but thumbs its nose at the fact 
that the U.S. Constitution clearly places 
authority over passports and regulations 
regarding U.S. citizens born abroad in the 
hands of Congress.” 
 
And the ADL expressed “deep 
disappointment” in the decision. It had 
earlier “argued that the purpose of passports 
is for identification, and that the issuance of 
them does not establish or implement 
foreign policy.” 
 
“Even Taiwan-born U.S. citizens are 
permitted to identify Taiwan as their 
birthplace, despite protests by China, the 
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recognized sovereign over that territory,” 
said Abraham H. Foxman, ADL’s national 
director. 
 
Nathan Diament, executive director of 
public policy for the Orthodox Union, said 
the fact that Jerusalem is Israel’s political 
capital “has been recognized again and again 
by the United States Congress and duly 
enacted laws, even as such recognition has 
been practically unrecognized by the 
Executive Branch… . The practice of the 
State Department to refuse compliance with 
the law is wrong and we will support the 
appeal of this ruling to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.” 
 
Marc Stern, the American Jewish 
Committee’s general counsel, said, “An 
American passport, not the current and 
future status of Jerusalem, is the core issue 
in the Zivotofsky case.” 
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“The Jerusalem Passport Case – Separation of Powers and Standing” 
The Volokh Conspiracy 
Eugene Kontorovich 
July 23, 2013 
The D.C. Circuit has held the Jerusalem 
passport law unconstitutional for 
impermissibly intruding into the Executive’s 
foreign relations powers. The law requiring 
the State Department to record “Israel” as 
the country of birth for those born in 
Jerusalem. The D.C. Circuit, through 
extensive and lucid analysis, concluded that 
recognition was an exclusively executive 
function, on which the Act impinges. The 
lawsuit, brought by Menachem Zivotofsky, 
an American born in Jerusalem, has gone on 
for a decade, but this will probably be the 
end. 
 
The D.C. Circuit’s separation of powers 
analysis was quite strong, though I think the 
case lacks standing, as Judge Gladys Kessler 
on the district court first ruled nine years 
ago. 
 
The plaintiff, claimed the issue was just 
about passports, and did not involve 
recognizing foreign countries. The argument 
was hard to take seriously: refusing to 
recognize Israeli sovereignty over Western 
Jerusalem, on passports or elsewhere, is a 
crucial limitation on the U.S.’s recognition 
of the State of Israel. 
 
More interesting was the plaintiff’s 
argument that Congress itself acted through 
an enumerated power – Immigration and 
Naturalization. The Court rather 
convincingly showed that passports were not 
central to this power, which in any case was 
concurrent with the Executive’s foreign 
policy powers. Thus in rock-paper-scissors 
terms, an exclusive executive power 
(recognition) beats a concurrent legislative 
one. 
 
One might think that the Immigration power 
naturally overlaps with recognition: 
immigration requires a prior determination 
of foreignness. The Executive has never 
taken a position one way or another the 
sovereignty over Jerusalem. Heck, it might 
be part of New York, in which case no 
immigration or naturalization would be 
needed. Indeed, because of the particular 
circumstances here – Congress is not 
contesting a determination of Jerusalem’s 
status, but rather a non-determination – one 
might think Congress cannot exercise its 
powers without such a determination. More 
broadly, immigration laws may allow 
different numbers of people to come from 
different countries, thus it would be essential 
to determine what country Jerusalem is in. 
 
Two years ago, the Supreme Court, in 
M.B.Z. v. Clinton, rejected the D.C. Circuit’s 
dismissal of the case on political question 
grounds. I would have instead dismissed for 
lack of standing, as the district court 
originally did (before being reversed by the 
Court of Appeals; the district court then 
dismissed as a political question, which the 
Supreme Court ultimately reversed). The 
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plaintiff has no injury. His passport is 
property of the State Department, he has no 
proprietary interest in its contents. 
 
Rather, the passport is merely a vehicle to 
challenge a broader government policy. The 
D.C. Circuit, in reversing the standing 
dismissal, concluded that the law created an 
new, individual right to have “Israel” written 
in one’s passport. Such a legal right would 
satisfy standing, but there is little evidence 
that Congress created such a right. The 
statute instructs the State Department to 
“upon the request of the citizen or the 
citizen’s legal guardian, record the place of 
birth as Israel”. This seems simply to specify 
the procedure by which “Israel” would be 
placed on the passport, rather than create a 
individual right. It is certainly less obviously 
a cause of action than procedural rights 
created under various administrative laws, 
where the Court has upheld standing (as in 
FEC v. Akins). Those at least specifically 
authorize lawsuits and speak of “aggrieved 
parties.” The provision in question looks 
more like an order to the administration, 
rather than the establishment of an 
individual right. 
 
Indeed, I suppose the reason for the “upon 
the request” language was not to require 
those born in Jerusalem who might not want 
it described at “Israel” to be forced to bear 
such a description in their passports; that 
would also generate additional hostility and 
opposition to the rule. If anything, this is an 
individual right to NOT have “Israel” 
printed in one’s passport. 
 
 
